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NUMBER 3
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW t
MARY ANN GLENDON *
INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged that the 1960's and 1970's saw a revolution of
sorts in American landlord-tenant law,' but the nature of that revolution is
disputed. To many, the essence of the change has seemed to be a shift of the
basis of lease law from principles of property to principles of contract. This
view is particularly noticeable in the opinions of judges who have been in-
strumental in bringing about fundamental alterations in the common law of
landlord-tenant,2 and it also seems to have been central to the thinking of the
draftsmen of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). 5
I Copyright © 1982 by Mary Ann Glendon.
• Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; B.A., J.D., M. Comp. L., Universi-
ty of Chicago. The research for this article was conducted as part of a multinational project titled
"Towards a Right to Housing: Strategies and Techniques of Western Legal Systems." The
project, sponsored by the Italian National Research Council, is under the direction of Professor
Dr. A. De Vita, at the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Florence, Italy.
Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,  56 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Abbott]; Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory War-
ranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 6 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Cunningham].
E.g. , javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was the conveyance of an in-
terest in land, courts have usually utilized the special rules governing real property transactions
to resolve controversies involving leases . . . . Our holding in this case reflects a belief that leases
of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract.") (footnote
omitted); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 324, 391 N.E.2d 1288,
1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (1979) ("Since a lease is more akin to a purchase of shelter and
services rather than a conveyance of an estate, the law of sales ... provides a ready analogy that
is better suited than the outdated law of property to determine the respective obligations of
landlord and tenant.") (citation omitted). See also Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
622-25, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-74, 1182, 111  Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-10, 718 (1974); Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 333, 521 P.2d 304, 308
(1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 197, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842 (1973);
Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 282, 405 A.2d 897, 902 (1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d
658, 659-60 (Tex. 1978).
3 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
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In fact, however, landlord-tenant case law was already deeply pervaded by
contract notions by the end of the nineteenth century. 4 Awareness of this
earlier contractualization of lease law has led one writer to interpret the recent
changes as primarily involving a movement from traditional contract law to
modern commercial law.' Where leases of dwellings are concerned, some
scholars have seen in recent developments a transition from contract to status.°
Another scholar has identified the motive force of change in residential lease
law as neither property nor contract, but "the moral principle of redistribution
of wealth from landlord to tenant.'"
This article proposes to show that what has been called a revolution ap-
pears, in historical perspective, to have been no more or less than the culmina-
tion, in one area of the law, of certain long-standing trends that have
transformed not only landlord-tenant law, but private law generally over the
past century. Lease law was never pure property law. 9 By the turn of the cen-
tury, and up to the 1960's, it was an amalgam of real and personal property
principles and of property and contract notions. 9 It consisted mostly of case
law, but even in the nineteenth century it had acquired an overlay of statutory
regulation. Over the twentieth century, the elimination of certain anomalies
within lease law brought it into closer harmony with modern principles of con-
tract, tort, civil procedure and commercial law.'°
What is new, if not revolutionary, in the past twenty years, is that residen-
tial and commercial landlord-tenant law have gradually diverged, the former
more influenced by developments in consumer law," the latter by commercial
law.'z The decisive element in the transformation of the residential landlord-
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform
State Laws 1972) (amended 1974), 7A Unif. Laws Ann. 499 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
URLTA]. "Existing landlord-tenant law in the United States, save as modified by statute or
judicial interpretation, is a product of English common law developed within an agricultural
society at a time when doctrines of promissory contract were unrecognized." URLTA, § 1.102
comment. See also Brake! & McIntyre, URLTA in Operation: An Introduction, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 559, 560-61 [hereinafter cited as Brake! & McIntyre]; Brake!, URLTA in Operation:
The Oregon Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 565, 567 [hereinafter cited as Brakel].
' See 2 R. PowELL, THE LAIN OF REAL PROPERTY Ir 221[1], especially at 181, 187 (P.
Rohan ed. 1977); Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443
(1972); Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance.? — A Historical  Inquiry, 52 J. URS. L.
649 (1975); and Weinberg, From Contract to Conveyance: The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 1800-1920
(Part I), 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 29.
o Siegel, supra note 4, at 685-86.
6 Cunningham, supra note 1, at 3; Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and
Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REV. 242, 258 (1974); Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From
Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years? 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369 (1961).
Meyers, The Convenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute,  27 STAN. L. REV.
879, 882 (1975) (criticizing the Restatement (2d) of Property's adoption of the implied warranty
of habitability, even though it reflected the trend of decisions) [hereinafter cited as Meyers]. See
also Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law — Are Landlords Public Utilities? 60 NEB. L. REV. 707
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Berger, New Residential].
6 See text and notes at notes 19-40 infra.
9 See text and notes at notes 41-59 infra.
'° See text and notes at notes 60-119 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 120-269 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 362-75 infra.May 1982]	 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 505
tenant relationship has been its subjection to pervasive; mostly statutory,
regulation of its incidents. Contrary to a widespread belief among jurists, this
process has been less the product of highly publicized court decisions
establishing implied warranties of habitability in residential leases, than of
steadily proliferating legislation." Together, legislative and judicial treatment
of leases of dwellings now make it plain that the movement in residential lease
law has been not from one area of private law to another, but from private
ordering to public regulation." In this process of transition from private to
public law, the habitability issue, which has dominated residential landlord-
tenant law for the past two decades, is now yielding center stage to
developments even more far-reaching in their implications: rent regulation,
security of tenure for the tenant, and the qualification of the landlord's tradi-
tional rights to alienate the freehold or to convert it to another use.
The present article examines these fundamental shifts in the technical
foundations of commercial and residential landlord-tenant law," and traces
the accompanying alteration in conceptions of the respective proprietary rights
of residential landlord and tenant." Underlying these latter changes is the idea
that shelter is a basic human necessity, and that public regulation of the terms
and conditions on which it is offered and held is therefore appropriate. Increas-
ing acceptance of this implicit premise has made legislative and judicial regula-
tion of the residential rent contract as inevitable as it was of the employment
contract.'7 Yet the relation of regulatory landlord-tenant law to the supply and
quality of rented housing is problematic," raising serious questions for future
housing policy.
I. THE HYBRID NATURE OF LEASEHOLD ESTATES AND THEIR EVOLUTION
The notion that American landlord-tenant law has evolved from property
to contract ignores the long and variegated history of the leasehold estates. This
history is that of a hybrid legal institution, neither entirely contractual nor en-
tirely proprietary. The earliest leases of which we know in the common law
systems were not considered real property. That rights under these leases were
treated as more contractual than proprietary was only natural since the pur-
pose of the early term of years typically had nothing to do with subsistence or
shelter.'9 During the thirteenth century, when the legal characteristics of the
13 See text and notes at notes 120-75 infra.
14 See text and notes at notes 270-361 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 176-361 infra. The law review articles by Abbott and Cun-
ningham, sup-a note 1, survey and analyze with a wealth of detail the present state of residential
landlord-tenant law. The present article draws on the work of Professors Abbott and Cunning-
ham to support some of the general statements made here concerning trends in current law. The
reader interested in an extensive treatment of particular issues is referred to those excellent ar-
ticles.
16 See text and notes at notes 426-77 infra.
17 See generally M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 143-205
(1981) for a discussion of the judicial and legislative treatment of the employment contract over
the past century, with a brief comparison between it and the lease agreement.
18 See text and notes at notes 376-425 infra.
13 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 36, 111, 113 (2d
ed. 1923).506	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
term for years began to take shape, the term was primarily used as "a common
part of the machinery whereby land was gaged for money lent.'"° Leaseholds
at that time thus had a merely formal resemblance to the freehold estates,
which normally served as the continuing economic basis of a family. Probably
because of this background of use as a security device, the term of years was
classified as a non-freehold estate and as personal, rather than real, property."
But with the rise of farming leases in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the
tenant's situation became similar to that of other landholders. The law
recognized this at the end of the fifteenth century by according tenants the right
to bring the "real action" of ejectment to recover the possession of land."
Despite its assimilation over time to interests in real property, however, the in-
terest of the lessee has never completely outgrown its early classification as per-
sonal property."
Gradually, as the term of years came to be used primarily for agricultural
purposes, the termor's interest was treated as in many ways analogous to the
rights of owners of freehold estates. In Blackstone's eighteenth century scheme,
it was, if not real property, an estate in real property. Blackstone classified the
leasehold estates (which he listed as estates for years, estates at will and estates
at sufferance) in his Book H (The Rights of Things) under "Things Real."
There, these "estates less than freehold" were grouped with freehold estates in
real property, rather than with personal property or contracts. The
distinguishing feature of the estate for years in Blackstone's time, and now, is that
it must end at or before a fixed date." Normally, a term for years ends at the
expiration of the period fixed, no other notice being required." A  tenancy at will
at common law was a tenancy which could be terminated by either party at any
time, without formal notice." The tenancy at sufferance merely denotes the situa-
tion of a person who lawfully gained possession of land and retains it after his
right to possess the land has ceased."
By the end of the nineteenth century it was usual to add to Blackstone's
list a fourth type of leasehold estate, the periodic tenancy. These tenancies became
important particularly when multi-unit apartment buildings arose to meet the
20 Id. at 112.
" Id. at 113, 115-16. Its special connection with land was, nevertheless, recognized by
calling it a chattel real. Id. at 116.
22 T. PLucKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 574 (5th ed. 1956).
22 2 POWELL, supra note 4, 221[2j at 187-91; C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 64 (1962). See also Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 397, 400,
88 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (1970).
24 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 140.
23 Id. at *140, •143. See also MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 65-69. Despite its name, the
term for years may be for a period less than a year. See id. at 67. Thus, a lease "to T, for one
week" creates a term for years in T because the term has a fixed duration.
26 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 78. Such leases may also come to an end upon the
happening of an event specified in the lease, surrender by the tenant and acceptance thereof by
the landlord, and upon the exercise by either party of a power to terminate reserved in the lease.
Id.
27 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *145; 1 H. TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT S 13 at 111 (1912); MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 84.
28 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at * 150; MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 85.May 1982]
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housing needs of a mobile working population. A periodic tenancy is one which
runs continuously from period to period, until one party terminates it by giving
proper notice, usually equivalent to the length of the measuring period, or, if
the measuring period is a year or more, to half that period.29 Commonly such
tenancies are from month-to-month, or year-to-year. They can be created by
lease, but more often they arise by implication of law. 3° Blackstone knew of the
periodic tenancy, but had treated it as a form of the tenancy at will.31 At com-
mon law, when T entered on L's land with L's permission, but without any
specific agreement as to the duration of the tenancy, the arrangement was
presumed to be terminable at will. Because of the hardship a sudden termina-
tion could cause in such situations, however, Blackstone, writing in the latter
half of the eighteenth century, said:
[C]ourts of law have of late years leaned as much as possible against con-
struing demises, where no certain term is mentioned, to be tenancies at
will; but have rather held them to be tenancies from year to year so long as
both parties please, especially where an annual rent is reserved: in which
case they will not suffer either party to determine the tenancy even at the
end of the year, without reasonable notice to the other. 32
Thus, even in the eighteenth century, courts were hesitant to subject a tenant
to immediate dispossession unless it was clear that both parties had agreed to
such an arrangement.
Over the nineteenth century, the importance of the periodic tenancy in-
creased while that of the tenancy at will diminished. While the prevailing
American rule was said to be that a general letting (a lease for an indefinite
period), without more, gave rise to a tenancy at will," this rule was practically
swallowed by exceptions. A periodic tenancy arose by implication if a periodic
rent was reserved in the lease, or if T entered on L's land without specification
of term or rent, but then paid rent, which L accepted, on a periodic basis. 34
Rules such as these must have converted most tenancies at will into periodic
tenancies. The harshness of the at-will termination rule was also mitigated by
statutes in several states which provided that even a tenancy-at-will could not
be terminated without some specified period of notice." Like the courts in
Blackstone's day, state legislatures were concerned about the effects an abrupt
termination could have upon a tenant.
Both the uses of the leasehold estates and the form of leases changed
substantially in the century after Blackstone's Commentaries were written.
29 MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 79.83:
'° See text and note at note 34 infra.
31 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at "147.
32 Id.
33 I TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 13 at 105 and S 14 at 129-32.
34 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 14 at 125, 129. MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 81. Pay-
ment and acceptance of rent under a lease which is invalid, for example, because of the writing
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, will create a periodic tenancy, id. at 82, except in Maine
and Massachusetts where, by statute, such tenancies remain at will.  Id. at 82 n.10. A tenant who
holds over with the landlord's permission at the expiration of his lease term also becomes a
periodic tenant if the landlord recognizes him as a tenant, for example, by accepting rent. Id.
33 I TIFFANY, supra note 27, S 13 at 112; MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 84-85.508	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
Leases were still being used in agricultural settings, but, with the advance of
urbanization, they were also becoming common arrangements through which
tenants secured business premises and shelter. In these two latter situations,
the structures on the land were often at least as important a part of the transac-
tion as the land itself. The written lease, especially in commercial contexts,
became longer. It began to look less like a conveyance of land, and more like a
contract with its sets of mutual promises in which the parties provided for con-
tingencies and otherwise worked out the details of what was to be a continuing
relationship. Increasingly, the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant
came to be fixed, less by the common law, and more by the covenants of the
lease." In business leases, such covenants are often the product of a bargaining,
process; in written residential leases, they are apt to be contained in standard-
ized forms which are presented to the tenant on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.'"
The common law of the landlord-tenant relationship, a compound of property
and contract," was increasingly displaced by the parties' contract, and in such
cases became a kind of stop-gap law that applied if the parties had not agreed
otherwise.
While the development of the written lease increased the contractual
elements of the landlord-tenant relationship, in urban residential tenancies,
especially among low-income groups, the periodic tenancy without a written
lease became common. As Powell described these arrangements,
[The tenants] "rent" a space in which to live, agreeing to pay so much
every week or every month, out of the periodically received pay check or
pay envelope. Duration of the occupancy is undiscussed. The tenant's
ability to pay is so dependent on the unpredictable regularity of earnings,
and his desire to remain is so dependent upon possible changes in his place
of employment, that an agreement obligating him to an estate for years is
not commonly made. From the lessor's angle, no useful end is likely to be
served by a more definitive arrangement. Few of these tenants have assets
sufficient to make a judgment collectible. The uncertainties of life which
beset our mobile industrial and white-collar population are suited by the
fluidity of arrangement implicit in this type of nonfreehold estate. Two
results flow from the foregoing. This type of estate is tremendously impor-
tant sociologically in that occupancy thereunder conditions the home life of
a very substantial fraction of the population. On the other hand, the finan-
cial smallness of the involved rights results in a great dearth of reported
decisions from the courts concerning them. Their legal consequences are
chiefly fixed in the "over the counter" mass handling of "landlord and ten-
ant" cases of the local courts. So this type of estate, judged sociologically, is
of great importance, but judged on the basis of its jurisprudential content,
is almost negligible."
The economic circumstances of urban residential tenants thus militated against
56 2 POwELL, supra note 4 221[1] at 180-81.
" Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease. Can Contract Law Provide the Answer? 71 Nw. .
U.L. REV. 204, 232 (1976).
38 Weinberg, supra note 4, at 31.
39 2 POwELL, supra note 4, 41 253 (footnote omitted).May 1982]
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the use of written leases. The periodic tenancy was barely visible in the case
law and legal literature.
The increasingly contractual content of leases and the special cir-
cumstances of residential leases and leases of parts of multiple-unit buildings
were already influencing landlord-tenant law as it stood at the turn of the cen-
tury, that law which is described in the following section as "classical." When
Powell summarized the situation in his great treatise on property, first pub-
lished in 1949, the contractual aspects of leases were often controlling:
[T]he background of the lease as a conveyance, built solidly by 1500, has a
tremendous foreground, evolved largely since 1800, which is purely con-
tractual in character. The modern law is the synthesis of these twoihistorical
factors. Sometimes the background peeks through and controls. Sometimes
the foreground alone is considered determinative."
Thus, the lease has long been a hybrid of many strains: contract and con-
veyance, personal and real property, promise and covenant. All these
elements, together with the beginnings of statutory regulation, were mingled in
the classical law of landlord and tenant.
II. CLASSICAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
A. The Basic System
American commercial and residential landlord-tenant law assumed the
form that it had on the eve of the landlord-tenant "revolution" over the course
of the nineteenth century in an era when property was losing, and contract was
gaining, predominance in private law.'" Notions of freedom of contract and
laissez-faire were at their zenith. Three leading ideas, one from property and
two from contract, met and intertwined in the fundamental rules which
governed the landlord-tenant relationship. The first notion was the conception
of the lease as a sale of possession for rent.42 The second was the idea that con-
tracts should be held sacred: pacts stint servanda. 43 This second idea was con-
tained within the third, which is the broad notion of freedom of contract, which
" Id. 1 221(1) at 181 (footnote omitted).
•1 J. W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY UNITED STATES 12 (1956).
42 MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 71.
" One of the leading decisions is an early landlord and tenant case, Paradine v. Jane,
Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). There the court refused to release the tenant from his
obligation to pay rent even though, during civil war, the tenant had been ousted from possession
by the army of "an enemy to the King." Id. The court said: "[W]hen the party by his own con-
tract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstand-
ing any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his con-
tract." Id. at 27, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897. With the rise of capitalism, it became one of the main
functions of contract law to assure "that bargains would be kept and that legitimate expectations
created by contractual promises would be honored." F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (1953). The idea that contracts should be held sacred found repeated
expression in the 19th century case law. Id. at 4-5.510	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
meant that, subject to narrow limits, the legal system would enforce the
bargains of private parties as written in the same way that it would enforce
legislation.'* Courts rarely disturbed contractual clauses of the type which to-
day would be called onerous.
There was very little public control over the quality, type and location of
housing, rented or otherwise, in the nineteenth century, except in certain of the
nation's largest cities where conditions in the tenements that had appeared
with industrial expansion and immigrations were believed to be a menace to
public health." The activity of the federal government in the housing area was
sporadic and small-scale until the Depression years of the 1930's, and, with few
exceptions, that of state governments was practically nil until the 1960's.
The contours of classical landlord-tenant law can be delineated by describ-
ing a few of its basic rules. Most of these rules, from their inception, were sub-
ject to qualifications, exceptions, and to judicial avoidance through
characterization of the facts of individual cases. But until the Iate 1960's, they
still constituted the starting points for any legal analysis of landlord-tenant rela-
tions. A gradual process of erosion culminated in the demise of many of these
rules in the 1960's and 1970's and in the substitution of new and often opposite
starting points, especially where residential tenancies are concerned. 46 The
legal treatment of leases of dwellings has become differentiated from that of
business tenancies where there is more apt to be bargaining between the par-
ties, and from farming or mineral leases where structures are either not in-
volved or are incidental to the main purpose of the transaction. Before discuss-
ing such developments, however, it is necessary to outline the classical
landlord-tenant relationship.
In the classical scheme, the landlord's principal obligations related to
possession and the tenant's to rent. Thus, the landlord was obliged to give the
tenant at least good title and a clear right to possession at the commencement of
the term.47 During the term, the tenant had the right to expect that his posses-
sion would not be materially disturbed by the landlord, anyone acting under
the landlord's authority, or anyone with a title paramount to that of the
landlord. This right, inherent in the tenant's estate, came to be expressed as
the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment." The landlord had no obligation to
deliver the premises in any particular physical condition or state of repair,"
44 P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 634 (1979); KESSLER
& SHARP, supra note 43, at 3.
46 L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION
26-29 (1968).
46 See text and notes at notes 176-269 infra. The parallels between the legal transforma-
tion of the landlord-tenant relationship and the earlier reworking of the law governing the in-
dividual employment contract are striking. See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 143-205.
4' 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 182 at 1147-54, 1156-67. In England, and a number of
American states, he had to deliver actual possession; see the discussion in Teitlebaum v. Direct
Realty Co., 172 Misc. 48, 49, 13 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887-88 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
46 See 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, S 79 at 522-23.
49 Id. 5 86(a) at 556.May 1982]
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and, a fortiori, no duty to maintain or repair them during the term. 5° The lessee
was expected to examine the premises and decide for himself whether they were
fit for his purposes." After the lease was entered, as after a sale, the risk of loss
or deterioration belonged to the lessee. Thus, even if the premises were
destroyed or rendered unfit for the tenant's purposes during the lease term, the
tenant's obligation to pay rent in principle continued unaffected. 52 The
tenant's obligations towards the landlord with respect to the premises were
defined by the law of waste, that is, by the same body of rules that governed a
life tenant's duties towards remaindermen or reversioners." Hence, the tenant
was obliged to make such ordinary repairs as were necessary to prevent waste
and deterioration, but not to make substantial, lasting and general repairs."
The tenant's obligation to pay rent was grounded both in the property law
notion that the rent "issued from the land" as a tenurial service of the tenant's
estate,55 and (where the tenant had expressly covenanted to pay rent) in the
idea of absolute contractual obligation." This made it doubly difficult for a ten-
ant to defend a rent action. Furthermore, the contract doctrine of mutual
dependence of promises, developed by Lord Mansfield in the late eighteenth
century, was not imported into the law of leases." Thus, even a breach by the
landlord of an express covenant, such as a covenant to repair, did not relieve
the tenant of any part of his obligation to pay rent; and the breach by the tenant
of his rent covenant did not give the landlord the right to retake possession."
The aggrieved party was limited to suing for contractual relief (plus, in the case
of the landlord, to seizing and holding chattels on the land as security for rent)
unless a statute or the lease itself gave him additional rights." This last, all-
important, qualification, however, leads to a consideration of the extent to
which, even at the turn of the century, exceptions to these and other common
law rules had appeared: through commonly used lease provisions, statutory
developments and the case law.
5° Id.	 87(a) at 574.
51 The following statement in Franklin v, Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889), is
typical:
It is uniformly held in this state that the lessee of real property must run the risk
of its condition, unless he has an express agreement on the part of the lessor cover-
ing that subject. As was said by the learned General Term when deciding this case:
The tenant hires at his peril and a rule similar to that of caveal my:dor applies, and
throws on the lessee the responsibility of examining as to the existence of defects in
the premises, and of providing against their ill effects.'
Id. at 115, 23 N.E. at 127.
52 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 87(g) at 617. See also id. 5 182 at 1191.
" Id. 5 109 at 706.
54 E.g., Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 453-55 (1873).
55 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 165 at 1009.
56 See note 43 supra. See also Siegel, sup-a note 4, at 651-58.
97 MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 70; A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY 366 (2d ed. 1969).
56 E.g., Brown's Adm'r v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122, 123 (1864). MOYNIHAN, supra note 23,
at 70.
59 Id. at 70-71.512	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
B. Erosion of the Classical System
1. Remedies
Not surprisingly, breach of the two most important obligations in a
lease—the tenant's duty to pay rent and the landlord's duty to protect the ten-
ant's possession—gave rise to more extensive remedies than the bare statement
of the classical common law rules of landlord-tenant law would suggest. Lease
provisions, and often statutes, in the nineteenth century made it virtually cer-
tain that a landlord could terminate a lease upon the tenant's default in rent."
Indeed, leases ordinarily contained (frequently-litigated) provisions, of a type
still familiar, attempting to authorize the landlord to terminate upon the ten-
ant's breach of any of his other obligations." The nineteenth century also saw
the proliferation of "summary process" statutes which established expeditious
judicial procedures for enforcing a landlord's rights against tenants in default
or holding over after the expiration of their term. Summary process statutes, to
the extent they were construed as displacing commonly used self-help reme-
dies, protected tenants from forcible eviction by landlords." Primarily, how-
ever, they benefited landlords by giving them an alternative to the time-
consuming and expensive action of ejectment. When leases routinely came to
involve buildings, especially those with services and areas that remained under
the control of the landlord, the lessor was apt to have substantial continuing ex-
penses with respect to the leased property even when the flow of rent was inter-
rupted. In summary proceedings, the right to possession could be tried in a
much simpler and speedier manner than in an ordinary civil action.
So far as the tenant's rights were concerned, there was an expansion in the
nineteenth century of the common law doctrine that if the landlord ousted the
tenant from the leased premises during the term, the landlord was not only
liable on the covenant for quiet enjoyment, but his right to rent was suspended
or extinguished in whole or in part, depending on the circumstances. 63
Gradually, it began to be accepted that an eviction could be constructive as
well as actual." The doctrine of constructive eviction seems to have first ap-
peared in the 1826 New York case of Dyett v. Pendleton, 65 where the tenant was
permitted to defend a rent action by showing that he was compelled to leave the
premises because of the landlord's loud and "indecent ... practices and pro-
ceedings" in another part of the building where the tenant's rooms were
located.66 The rationale of the case illustrates how closely intertwined property
60 Id. at 70 n.3; 2 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 274(d) at 1764.
61 See the cases cited in 2 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 274(e) at 1765.
62 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71-72 (1972). See also Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d
597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961) where such a statute was used by a tenant against a
landlord who had retaken possession without resort to the courts.
63 2 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 184 at 1258.
6+ Id. 5 185(a) at 1258-59.
63 8 Cow. 726 (N.Y. 1826).
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and contract notions were in lease law at the time. The court repeatedly
grounded its conclusions in both areas. On the central issue, it found the
evidence "tended to prove a disturbance of ... quiet possession, and a failure
of the consideration on which only the tenant was obliged to pay rent . . " 67
Although the doctrine of constructive eviction was not widely applied in
the nineteenth century, its details were worked out in a small number of cases.
Constructively evicted tenants were permitted to treat their leases as ter-
minated, not merely to treat the rent as suspended; the category of acts by the
landlord which, though falling short of actual physical ouster, were held
materially to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of his lease, was
enlarged; and the requirement that the tenant must leave the premises as a
condition to asserting the defense was established. 68 In some of these cases, the
landlord's failure to act where he had a duty to act was held to constitute a con-
structive eviction.69 Cases giving tenants relief for breaches of covenants to pro-
vide heat, electricity, plumbing or other important services became common in
the twentieth century. As courts began routinely to permit "constructive evic-
tion" to serve as a remedy for a landlord's breach of covenants in the lease, the
legal fiction became a functional substitute for the missing doctrine of mutually
dependent covenants."
Constructive eviction proved to be a flexible tool for dealing with a variety
of landlord-tenant problems over the first half of the twentieth century.
Though it did not create any new duties, the remedy did indirectly alleviate
some of the harsh effects of the rule that a landlord had no duty to deliver or
maintain the premises in a fit, safe or habitable condition. 11 It did not serve to
permit termination in all cases where the premises were seriously deficient,
however, since it was necessary for the tenant to show that the landlord could
somehow be charged with responsibility for the condition that deprived the ten-
ant of the enjoyment of the leased premises." Furthermore, the requirement
that the tenant must vacate the leased premises in order to show they had really
become "uninhabitable" was, though logical, increasingly felt to be burden-
some. In the case of low-income urban tenants, there was often no better alter-
native housing available at rents they could afford. In addition, any tenant who
did vacate his dwelling took the risk that the court might not agree that the con-
ditions had justified his departure. This risk must have been reduced, however,
in the case of low-income tenants by the probability that landlords would often
not consider it worthwhile to seek a money judgment against them.
On the eve of the landlord-tenant revolution, some courts were developing
doctrines that, under certain circumstances, would permit a tenant to claim
67 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
68 MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 71-72.
69 2 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 185 at 1271-73.
7° MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 72-73.
71 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 87 at 577.
72 See Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N.Y. 345, 351, 24 N.E. 716, 718 (1890).514	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
constructive eviction while remaining in possession. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1959 employed the notion of
equitable constructive eviction, according to which a tenant would not have to
leave the premises in order to qualify for equitable relief." In the early 1960's,
some lower courts in New York invoked the theory of partial eviction (which at
common law had permitted a tenant who was physically evicted from a part of
the premises to remain in possession without paying any rent)74 to support a
doctrine of partial constructive eviction. This doctrine would have obviated the
necessity for tenants to vacate the leased premises before claiming the rent was
suspended.75 Such further elaboration of the constructive eviction idea,
however, became increasingly unnecessary because, as demonstrated below,"
the entire legal relationship of residential landlord and tenant by then was be-
ing fundamentally restructured through legislative and judicial action in most
jurisdictions.
2. Condition of the Premises at the Time of Leasing
So long as structures on the land did not often figure importantly in leas-
ing arrangements, the analogy between the lease and the sale of real estate
probably accorded more or less with the way the parties to leases viewed their
transactions. But with urbanization and with leases of multi-unit buildings,
especially for residential purposes, the issue of the fitness of the premises for the
use contemplated by the parties moved to the foreground. Issues of title and
right to possession, all-important in the early law, and even the existence of in-
decent activities nearby (noisy enjoyment being a recurring subject in nine-
teenth century quiet enjoyment cases), were probably of less pressing concern
to urban residential tenants than were vermin infestation, defective plumbing
or extreme disrepair.
By the late nineteenth century, the general rule that the landlord had no
duty to deliver the premises in a fit condition was subject to certain exceptions.
The oldest and best established of these was the time-honored &cepa° dolls, the
exception for fraudulent misrepresentation of the condition of the premises. 77
In the classical law, fraud was hard to prove, but this exception gradually ex-
panded with the law of misrepresentation generally. 78 Another exception,
originating in certain nineteenth century English cases, gained a precarious
foothold in the American case law. This was the rule that, in a short-term lease
75 Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 129-30, 163 N.E.2d 4,
7-8 (1959).
74 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 182 at 1160.
75 E.g., Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 480, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754-55 (Civ.
Ct.),rev'd, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1964).
74' See text at notes 120-269 infra.
77 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 86 at 561-62.
" E.g. , Scudder v. Marsh, 224 Ill. App. 355, 358 (1922). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5 106 at 696-98 (4th ed. 1971), and 51C C.J.S. Landlord &
Tenant 5 223(1) (1968).May 19821
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of furnished premises, the landlord was obligated to deliver the premises in a
condition fit for the purposes of the lease.79
Finally, a few states quite early established limited statutory exceptions to
the rule of caveat emptor. The great codification movements of the nineteenth
century had had their partisans not only in England, where Jeremy Bentham
tried unsuccessfully to convince his countrymen of the superiority of codifica-
tion to the common law, but also in the United States where David Dudley
Field actually did succeed in persuading a handful of state legislatures to adopt
the Civil Code he and others had drafted." One provision of this code required
the lessor of a building intended for human occupation to put it into condition
fit for such use, and the following section required the lessor to repair all subse-
quent dilapidations not occasioned by the lessee's negligence." If the landlord
violated these duties, the tenant was permitted either to leave the premises or to
apply one month's rent toward making the repairs. 82 In the Louisiana Civil
Code, where, in accordance with civil law tradition, the lease was regarded as
belonging to the field of contractual obligations, the lessor was also obliged to
deliver and maintain the premises in a condition fit for the purpose for which
they were rented. 83 All of these statutory duties, however, could be, and
presumably frequently were, excluded by contract. Thus their main effect in
practice was probably to cause the inclusion of waiver clauses in written leases.
These early statutes were forerunners of what was to become the dominant
mode of change in residential landlord-tenant law.
3. Conditions Arising During the Lease Term
Apart from the statutes just mentioned, there were few exceptions to the
common law rule that the landlord had no duty to make repairs or to otherwise
" E.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). See generally 1 TIFFANY,
supra note 27, $ 86 at 570-74. Tiffany, in criticizing this exception, unintentionally forecast what
would eventually become the rule, half a century later, for most residential leases:
If this peculiar doctrine were to be applied to every case of a short term lease in
which immediate occupation is intended, the well established rule of the common
law, that the lessee must make his objections to the condition of the premises
before taking the lease, would be to a great extent nullified, and in every case of a
short term lease a dissatisfied lessee would assert that he took the premises for im-
mediate occupation.
Id. S 86 at 572-73.
8° The five states were California (1866), Georgia (1863), Montana (1872), and North
and South Dakota (1872). Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS 17, 48 (A. Reppy ed. 1949).
81 E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. 55 1941, 1942 (West 1954). Sections 1941.1, 1941.2,
1942.1 and 1942.5 were added in 1970 and amended in 1979. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. 55
1941.1-.5 (West Supp. 1981).
82 See I TIFFANY, supra note 27, 87 at 578-79. The Dakotas originally did not so limit
the amount of rent that could be applied for repairs to one month's rent. Cunningham, supra note
1, at 57.
83 LA, CIV, CODE ANN. art. 2692 (West 1952), is similar to Art. 1719 of the French
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maintain the leased premises after the exclusive right to possession had been
transferred, or, to put it another way, after the risk of condition had passed to
the tenant. This rule followed logically from the fact that the landlord had no
duty to deliver the premises in a fit condition, and accorded with the notion
that transfer of possession of the land itself was the essence of the transaction.
When leases of improved land became common, the application of this
rule came to appear especially harsh in one situation—where the leased
premises were destroyed or made unsuitable for the tenant's purpose by some
calamity, such as fire or flood, during the lease term. The common law dictated
in these circumstances that the tenant's liability for the rent continued
unabated, because contracts should be enforced as written" and because so
long as the land remained there was something from whith the rent could
"issue. "85 This result was much criticized and some courts either did not ap-
ply it in such situations, or avoided it when possible by creative construction of
the lease. For example, by finding that a building or part of a building was
leased but the land it stood on was not, the court could excuse a tenant from lia-
bility for rent when the building was destroyed because there was nothing left
for the rent to "issue from.""
By the end of the nineteenth century, many jurisdictions had adopted
statutes which provided that if a leased building were destroyed or so injured
during the lease term as to make it "untenantable," the tenant would be per-
mitted to leave the premises and be relieved from his liability to pay rent." An
indirect effect of these statutes, in certain situations, was to encourage the
landlord to repair or rebuild if he wanted to keep his tenant.88 Furthermore,
while these statutes were sometimes narrowly construed to relieve the tenant
only in cases of sudden, fortuitous and total destruction, they were also on oc-
casion more broadly interpreted to permit the tenant to terminate the lease if
the premises gradually became unsuitable."
84 Siegel, supra note 4, at 656.
85 I TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 87 at 617-19, 1196.
86 Id. 5 87 at 1193, 1196.
87 E.g. , the 1860 New York statute, quoted in Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873),
which provided
that the lessees or occupants of any building, which shall, without any fault or
neglect on their part, be destroyed or be so injured by the elements or any other
cause as to be untenantable and unfit for occupancy, shall not be liable or bound to
pay rent to the lessors or owners thereof, after such destruction or injury, unless
otherwise expressly provided by written agreement or covenant; and the lessees or
occupants may thereupon quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises,
and of the land so leased or occupied.'
Id. at 453.
88 I TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 87 at 577.
89 Compare Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 453-57 (1873) (narrow construction) with
Meserole v. Hoyt, 161 N.Y. 59, 61-62, 55 N.E. 274, 274-75 (1899); Tallman v. Murphy, 120
N.Y. 345, 350-53, 24 N.E. 716, 718-19 (1890); and Vann v. Rouse, 94 N.Y. 401, 405-06 (1884)
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Where the statutes based on the Field Civil Code were in force, the no-
duty-to-maintain rule was, of course, displaced. Under these laws, however,
the tenant's only remedy if the landlord failed to maintain the leased premises
in habitable condition was to move out, unless the problem was a relatively
minor one that could be corrected by the application of rent. This placed the
tenant at much the same disadvantage as did the common law doctrine of con-
structive eviction.
A significant breach in the no-duty-to-maintain rule appeared in most
states with the advent of multi-unit buldings. In cases involving such buildings,
the courts generally held that the landlord had the duty to maintain areas open
to use by the tenant or facilities over which the landlord retained contro1. 9°
Constructive eviction and tort remedies were gradually made available to
tenants whose beneficial enjoyment was disturbed by,91 or who were injured
by,92 conditions in such areas. Since leased premises in multiple-unit buildings
can be seriously affected by heating, wiring and plumbing systems over which
the landlord has control, this exception became of major importance.
4. Tort Liability
It followed also from the general rule that the landlord had no duties
regarding the condition of the leasehold that he was in principle not liable in
tort to the tenant or to third parties for injuries to person or property owing to
defects in the leased premises.93 The tenant, as the person in possession and
control, had primary responsibility. However, courts and juries often strained
to avoid the effects of this rule and to bring individual cases within its ever-
widening exceptions. Thus, at the turn of the century, a landlord could be held
liable if at the time of leasing he had actual knowledge of a hidden dangerous
condition on the premises and had reason to believe the tenant would not
discover the condition, and did not disclose his information to the tenant."
Likewise if the landlord negligently failed to keep in repair common areas or,
under certain circumstances, other areas which were under his control; 95 or if
he had made voluntary repairs negligently, he could be liable in tort for
resulting injuries.96 Similarly, if the landlord knew at the time of the lease of a
dangerous condition on premises leased for use by the public, he might also in-
cur tort liability.97
" 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 89 at 628-40 and 5 91 at 641-44.
91 E.g. , Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Misc. 383, 130 N.Y.S. 231 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1911).
92 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 89 at 628-40 and 5 91 at 641-44.
93 Id. 5 87 at 575, 649. The tenant, as the person in possession and control, was
primarily liable to third parties injured by dangerous conditions on the premises. 52 C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant 435 at 206-12 (1968). See, e.g., King v. Cooney-Eckstein Co., 66 Fla. 246,
249, 63 So. 659, 660 (1913).
94 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, § 86 at 562-70.
96 Id. 5 89 at 628-40 and 5 91 at 641-44.
96 Id. 87 at 608.
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5. The Eve of the Landlord-Tenant Revolution
Until the mid-1960's, movement in residential and commercial landlord-
tenant law took place mainly along three well-defined channels, with
precedents in both areas being used interchangeably. The first of these was
through the exceptions to the rules described above. New exceptions were
developed from time to time98 and the old ones were expanded, 99 as the com-
mon law adapted in its characteristic way to changed social and economic con-
ditions. The second avenue of change in landlord-tenant law was through con-
tractual clauses in leases. Judicial activity regarding these clauses was par-
ticularly pronounced with respect to business leases. Even where residential
leases were concerned, however, contractual clauses often formed the basis for
developments in the law. For example, courts began to permit the breach of a
covenant to repair to serve as the basis for a tort action,'°° and more and more
courts made the constructive eviction defense available where the landlord had
violated material covenants in the lease."' Lease law also began to show some
of the effects of the liberalization of contract law that was taking place general-
ly. Tenants who had accepted harsh terms benefited from policies against
forfeitures,'" and from the courts' growing willingness to strictly construe or
even invalidate clauses providing for rent acceleration,'" penalties or li-
quidated damages,'" or self-help repossession. 105
The third path, which eventually became the high road of change in
landlord-tenant law, was associated with the rise in the twentieth century of the
administrative state in the United States. In the preceding century, as already
mentioned, only a handful of states had statutes imposing on landlords a duty
to put and keep leased premises in repair. Besides these, New York and
Massachusetts had public health and safety legislation setting publicly enforced
minimum standards for multiple dwellings in their largest cities, but laws of
98 For example, the exception for buildings under construction at the time of the lease
was based on the idea that the tenant's obligation to inspect could not be effectively carried out in
such circumstances. See J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930), reu'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933).
99 For example, it began to be held that a landlord could be liable for injuries resulting
from a dangerous condition at the time of leasing even if he had no actual knowledge of the condi-
tion, so long as he had reason to know of its existence. See, e.g. , Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn.
502, 504-07, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246-47 (1960).
'°° E.g., Faber v. Creswick, 31 N. J. 234, 239, 241, 156 A.2d 252, 254-55 (1959) (aban-
doning the requirement of privity and holding that breach of a covenant to repair could give rise
not only to contractual remedies, but also to an action for injuries proximately caused by a
negligent failure to perform the covenant).
'°' E.g., Automotive Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 200-02, 172
N.E. 35, 37 (1930). See also 2 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 185 (f) at 1271-73.
1°2 E.g., Jamaica Builders Supply Corp. v. Buttelman, 25 Misc. 2d 326, 205 N.Y.S.2d
303 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1960).
102 E.g., Ricker v. Rombough, 120 Cal App. 2d 912, 261 P.2d 328 (1953).
'" E.g., id.
'115 E.g., Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961).May 1982]
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this type remained rare.106 New York pioneered in devising legislative methods
to make the enforcement of these standards more effective: first, in 1929, by
barring actions for rent or eviction for non-payment of rent so long as the
landlord had not obtained a certificate of compliance with the state housing
law; then, in 1939, by permitting a stay of an action for rent or eviction for
non-payment of rent if serious code violations existed, provided that the
tenants deposited all rent due with the court. 1°7 These statutes, at the time, in-
spired few imitators outside New York.
After World War II, however, public interest and intervention in the
housing area increased. This was partly due to the state of affairs described by
Professor Abbott as follows:
By 1949, the effect of little new construction during the Depression and
World War II had created considerable obsolescence in the center city
housing stock. Most of the available land within cities had been developed.
The middle class exodus to the suburbs gathered momentum as the in-
surance benefits provided by the Veterans Administration and the Federal
Housing Administration brought mortgage financing of new home pur-
chases within the financial reach of an upwardly mobile urban middle and
lower-middle class. The migration to the cities of lower income blacks and
whites from rural America, increasing during the war years, continued
unabated.'"
In this atmosphere, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949 109 which com-
mitted the United States to a national policy of achieving "as soon as feasible"
the goal of "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family.' "'°
In 1954, the existence of housing codes began to be an important part of a
local government's showing of eligibility to receive federal urban renewal funds
and other forms of federal assistance. The detailed health and safety standards
of the old Massachusetts and New York tenement house legislation were the
prototypes for the more elaborate modern housing codes that began to be wide-
ly adopted." Within a few years, most American cities of over 50,000 people
had passed codes in basically similar form in order to qualify for federal urban
renewal funds."2 Eventually, some states passed state-wide housing codes.'"
Legislation establishing new obligations for landlords and new rights and
remedies for tenants also began to appear at the state level." 4 The proliferation
of state and local housing codes raised questions for the courts of whether viola-
1" Cunningham, supra note 1, at 11; Abbott, supra note 1, at 41-42.
tar Cunningham, supra note 1, at 23-24.
1°8 Abbott, supra note 1, at 43 (footnote omitted).
in Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §S 1441-1490(g) (1976).
"G Id. S 1441.
"i Cunningham, supra note 1, at 11.
112 Abbott, supra note 1, at 44.
113 Abbott, supra note 1, at 44 n.255, lists six states as having done so,
114 See text and notes at notes 120-269 infra.520	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
tion of statutory duties would be treated as giving rise to private rights of ac-
tion. In accordance with the general direction of the development of tort law,
the courts increasingly held that a landlord's violation of statutory safety re-
quirements was evidence of negligence, thus opening up a major exception to
the landlord's traditional limited immunity from tort liability. 115 These post-
World War II housing codes and state statutes eventually were to provide the
basis for some of the most fundamental judicial reforms of the classical
landlord-tenant law.
Nevertheless, with variations among the jurisdictions, the rules of classical
landlord-tenant tenant law still furnished the starting points for analysis of
most legal problems arising out of all types of leases until that period of ac-
celerated change which has been called a revolution in this body of law. Rules
essentially similar to those found in Tiffany's turn-of-the-century treatise were
still set forth as the "black letter law" in widely-used works." 6 During the
process of erosion that has been described here, there were still frequent in-
stances where despite, or perhaps because of, the hybrid nature of the lease, the
force of accepted doctrine seemed to prevent modern developments in other
fields from being imported into lease law. For example, the doctrines of an-
ticipatory breach and mitigation of damages were often unavailable in the com-
mon situation where the tenant unjustifiably abandoned the premises before
the expiration of the lease term."' In addition, the doctrine of independence of
covenants survived in a great many states. "s The landlord still had no common
law duty in principle to put and keep the leased premises in a safe and
habitable condition. Such duties as he undertook by covenant were in general
enforceable only in contract, and such duties as were imposed on him by
statute were backed up, with a few exceptions, only by administrative sanctions
and criminal penalties, neither of which, it is generally acknowledged, was very
effective."5 Thus, until the 1960's, the development of landlord-tenant law in
the various states displayed a variety of phenomena, some undermining the
classical law, others revealing its continued vigor.
" 5 Breach of duties imposed by a housing code was held to be a basis for tort liability in
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See generally
PROSSER, supra note 78, 63 at 400.
116 See W. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY S§ 10-15 (3d ed.
1965); CASNER & LEACH, supra note 57, Ch. 17 and 18. In Casner and Leach's property
casebook, the then emerging new residential landlord-tenant law was put in a separate chapter
entitled The Indigent Tenant. Id. at 499.
1" E.g., Heckel v. Griese, 12 N. J. Misc. 211, 171 A. 148 (1934). See also Hicks, supra
note 4, at 515-24. Siegel, supra note 4, at 663, 671-72, has usefully pointed out that classical con-
tract law did not treat all promises as dependent and that the mitigation principle applied to
damage actions, not to situations where the seller sued for the contract price. Id. Thus, so long as
rent and possession were viewed as the only central obligations in leases, landlord-tenant law was
not so inconsistent with classical contract law as it is with modern commercial law. Hicks,  supra
note 4, at 454-60, has shown that a number of courts in the early 20th century had in fact begun
to treat several other important lease terms as mutually dependent.
115 MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 70.
1'9 Abbott, supra note 1, at 49-56.May 1982]
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III. THE DEMISE OF CLASSICAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
IN RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES
A. Court-Legislature Interaction
A trilogy of District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals cases, decided
between 1960 and 1970, in which housing codes played an important role,
symbolized the decisive stages in the disintegration of classical landlord-tenant
law in America as it affected residential tenancies. In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co., 120 the court allowed a tenant's tort suit to be based on a land-
lord's code violation."' In Edwards v. Habib, 122 a tenant was permitted to de-
fend an eviction action on the grounds that the landlord had terminated her
month-to-month tenancy in retaliation against the tenant for having reported
code violations.'" Finally, in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 124 the court
discarded several common law rules at once: the landlord's lack of duties with
respect to the physical condition of premises; the independence of the tenant's
obligation to pay rent from the landlord's obligations with respect to the
premises; and the constructive eviction requirement that a tenant must vacate
the leased premises before asserting defenses to rent based on the condition of
the premises.
The crumbling of the classical rules in the case law of the late 1960's is
traceable in no small degree to the fact that, under the Johnson
administration's "Great Society" programs, legal assistance was made much
more accessible to indigent persons than it had been in the past.' 25 In the at-
mosphere of that time, expanding legal services bureaus began to attract
lawyers who were interested not only in aiding individual poor clients, but in
bringing about change in the legal and social systems. Thus, "ordinary"
residential landlord-tenant cases often became test cases which could be
financed, staffed and appealed, even though the amounts actually in controver-
sy might be quite small.
Legal aid bureaus all over the country were active in landlord-tenant mat-
ters in the 1960's, but it is probably not a mere accident that the most far-
reaching judicial changes were initially accomplished in the District of Colum-
bia. In the first place, housing conditions in Washington, D.C., were such as
1" 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
121 Id. at 949-51.
122 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
t" Id. at 699-701.
124 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). One might also mention
here Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968), where the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, using contract principles, held void a lease entered in violation of the housing
code. Id. at 837. Unlike the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, this case and its novel approach have had little influence outside the District of
Columbia. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 81.
11' See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970). Section
2809(a)(3) was repealed in 1974 by Pub. L. 93-355, § 3(d)(2), 88 Stat. 390 which established the
Legal Services Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996. See also Abbott, supra note 1, at 5.522	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
to arouse public concern. 126 But unlike several other jurisdictions, such as
California"' and New York,'" with similar problems in their metropolitan
areas, the District had not responded with legislation affording private
remedies. 129 The circumstances thus favored a judicial response of some sort. It
is also significant that a federal court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, then sat as, in effect, the Supreme Court of
the District."° The judges on this court were immersed on a day-to-day basis
in public and administrative law, and turned naturally to it for analogies. They
also were ready to see a public law dimension in seemingly private litigation.
Furthermore, two of the judges on that bench, Bazelon and Wright, were
already well known for their willingness to innovate in other areas. 13' The stage
was thus set for a judicial overthrow of classical landlord-tenant law in its ap-
plication to residential leases.
In retrospect, it can be seen that the District of Columbia cases were only
the flagships of a movement that had been long building. The way for change
had been prepared by the gradual proliferation of exceptions to the classical
rules. As the current of change began to accelerate in the social climate of the
1960's, it was swelled by a case-law stream building on the housing codes
adopted to obtain federal aid, and by a less remarked, but in the end stronger,
126 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied , 400 U.S. 925 (1970): ("Innumerable studies have documented the desperate condition
of rental housing in the District of Columbia . . ."). In 1977, Washington, D.C., had over a 16
percent incidence of inadequate housing units. President's Commission on Housing,  Interim
Report 18 (Oct. 30, 1981). See also note 414 infra.
127 See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1954).
125 See N .Y . REAL PROP. ACTS LAW, 5 755 (McKinney 1979) (which legitimated a form
of rent withholding in 1939); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW, Art. 7A 5 770 (McKinney 1979)
(which authorized another form of rent withholding in 1965).
129 This may have been due to some extent to the District of Columbia's unique con-
stitutional status. As the political entity containing the nation's capital, its legislature is the
United States Congress. It does, however, have a measure of home rule and a City Council. See
Cerwin, A Study of The Evolution and Potential of Landlord-Tenant Law and Judicial Dispute Settlement
Mechanism in the District of Columbia. Part I: The Substantive Law and the Nature of the Private Relation-
ship, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 457, 460 n.10 (1977). In 1955, like many other American
municipalities, the District of Columbia adopted a housing code in order to become eligible for
federal development funds. Id. at 460-61.
13° This federal appellate court heard appeals from the District's local trial courts and
from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals until a 1970 Court Reform Act went into effect
making the District of Columbia Court of Appeals the highest court of the District. See Pub. L.
No. 91-358 5 11-721-722, 11-921-23, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).  See the discussion in Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 367 (1974). Since then, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals has rather consistently given the influential Circuit Court of Appeals' landlord-tenant cases
a restrictive interpretation. E.g., Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187,
190-91 (D.C. 1976). See Chused, Contemporary Dilemmas of the Javins Defense: A Note on the Need for
Procedural Reform in Landlord-Tenant Law, 67 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1388-93 (1979).
'3' Judge Bazelon was probably best known for his opinion in Durham v, United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which he substituted the "product of a mental disease or
defect" test of criminal responsibility for the old M'Naghten rule (ability to tell right from
wrong). Id. at 869-74. Judge Wright early distinguished himself through his pioneering decisions
in civil rights cases. See J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 112-36 (1981).May 1982]
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statutory stream, until at last the classical law was submerged and relegated to
an undertow, tempering and qualifying the new doctrines of residential
landlord-tenant law.
Since the 1960's, a great variety of statutes displacing the common law of
residential landlord-tenant relations have been enacted at the state level. In
many jurisdictions, statutory change preceded and often precipitated major
case-law changes; in others, statutes followed case-law innovations, sometimes
qualifying them, sometimes codifying them. Several states enacted a number of
different kinds of landlord-tenant legislation. Some of these statutes concen-
trated merely on establishing new, tenant-initiated remedies for the landlord's
failure to comply with housing regulations;'32 others limited themselves to set-
ting out new rights and obligations between landlord and tenant, but left it to
the courts to work out remedies. 133 Most emblematic of the degree to which the
field has become statutory, however, is the fact that some nineteen jurisdictions
have enacted comprehensive residential landlord-tenant codes, nearly all of
them variants of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA)
or its predecessor, the American Law Institute's Model Landlord Tenant
Act.'34 Besides these states, at least nineteen other jurisdictions have implied
warranties imposed by statute, or statutory remedies for violation of housing
code habitability requirements, or both."' Thus, altogether, of at least forty
132 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, 5 127C, and ch. 239, 5 8A (West Supp.
1981). Both sections were enacted in 1965. Id, See generally Cunningham, supra note I, at 23-51.
'" E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 5 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). This statute,
adopted in 1975, codified the implied warranty of habitability that was emerging in New York
lower court decisions, but did not set forth remedies available to the tenant. See generally Cun-
ningham, supra note 1, at 59-65.
"4 ALASKA STAT. $5 34.03.010 to 34.03.380 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1979); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. SS 33-1301 to 33-1381 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981-82); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 55
47a-1 to 47a-20 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, $5 5101 to 5112 (Michie
1975 & Supp. 1978); FLA, STAT. ANN. $5 83.40 to 83.63 (West Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. 55 521-1 to 521-77 (1976 & Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN, 55 562A.1 to 562A.37 (West
Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. 55 58-2540 to 58-2573 (1976 & Supp. 1981); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. $5 383.505 to 383.715 (Bobbs Merrill Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. 55
70-24-101 to 70-24-442 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. $$ 76-1401 to 76-1449 (1976); NEV. REV.
STAT. 55 118A.010 to 118A.530 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. $S 47-8-1 to 47-8-51 (Supp. 1981);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 55 5321.01 to 5321.19 (Baldwin 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, 55
101 to 135 (West Supp. 1981-82); OR. REV. STAT. 55 91.700 to 91.865 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. 55 64-2801 to 64-2864 (1976); VA. CODE 55 55.248.2 to 55.248.40 (1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 55 59.18.010 to 59.18.900 (Supp. 1981). The Uniform Law Commissioners con-
verted the American Law Institute's 1969 Model Residential Landlord and Tenant Code into
the URLTA. Brakel, The Operational Impact of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,  15
Am, B. FOUND. RESEARCH REP. 1,1 (Winter 1980).
" 4 CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. SS 1941, 1941.1, 1941.2, 1942, 1942.1, 1942.5 (West 1954 &
Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE 5 6-320 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 5 6021 (1980 Supp.
1981-1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. S 8-211 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN., ch. 111, 55 127C to 127N (West Supp. 1981), and ch. 239, 5 8A (West Supp.
4981); MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 554.139 (MICH. STAT. ANN. 26.1109 (Callaghan 1970)); MINN.
STAT. ANN. 5 504.18 (West Supp. 1981); MO. ANN. STAT. 55 441.500 to 441.640 (Vernon
Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 2A:42-85 to 42-97 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW. $5 302(1)(b), 302-a (McKinney 1974); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW. 5 305-a (McKinney524	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
jurisdictions that have accorded new private rights and remedies to tenants
whose dwellings do not meet minimum standards of habitability, thirty-eight
have now done so by statute. 136 In addition, two other jurisdictions still have
nineteenth century code provisions requiring landlords to deliver and maintain
premises in habitable condition.' 37
Although the common law rule of caveat emptor and its corollary of no
duty to maintain have been displaced in the majority of these forty-two
jurisdictions by legislation, it has been the case law establishment or elabora-
tion of an implied warranty of habitability by the highest courts in some four-
teen jurisdictions that has attracted the most attention.' 38 These well-known
decisions of the 1960's and subsequent years were in fact anticipated by a 1931
Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Delameter v. Foremcm. 139 But Delameter v.
Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW 55 755, 769-782 (McKinney 1979 & Supp.
1981-1982); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. 55
42-42 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-16-13.1 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 5 1700-1
(Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS 55 34-18-16 and 45-24.2-11 (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
55 43-32-8 and 43-32-9 (Supp. 1981); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f (Vernon Supp.
1981); W. VA. CODE $ 37-6-30 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. 704.07 (West 1981); D.C. R.
& RECS. tit. 5G, 55 2902.1, 2902.2 (1970).
'6 These jurisdictions include the 19 states with comprehensive landlord-tenant codes,
supra note 134; the 19 states with other forms of legislative reallocation of the traditional rights
and duties of landlord and tenant, supra note 135; and Illinois and Indiana, where the courts have
recognized an implied warranty of habitability. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 356-67,
280 N.E.2d 208, 212-18 (1972); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 764-94 (Ind.
App. 1976). In 14 jurisdictions, the courts at the highest level and the legislatures, have reworked
the residential landlord-tenant relationship. See cases cited in note 138 infra. See also notes 134
and 135 supra.
'" GA. CODE ANN. 5 61-111 (1979); LA. Civ. CODE art. 2692 (West 1952).
336 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627-40, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175-84, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 711-20 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433-36, 462 P.2d 470, 474-76 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 356-67, 280 N.E.2d 208, 212-18 (1972); Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791, 796-98 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 333-36, 521 P.2d 304,
308-10 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 190-203, 293 N.E.2d 831,
838-45 (1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92-94, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 140-47, 265 A.2d 526, 531-35 (1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272,
279.97, 405 A.2d 897, 900-10 (1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 659-61 (Tex.
1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 24-33, 515 P.2d 160, 162-67 (1973); Teller v.
McCoy,253 S.E.2d 114, 123-31 (W. Va. 1978); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-97, 111
N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961). But see in connection with Pines v. Perssion, notes 159 and 160  in-
fra.
Lower courts in four other states have adopted implied warranty theories. Old Town
Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 764 (Ind. App. 1976); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65, 75 (Mo. App. 1973); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 28-30, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806-08
(1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 463-64, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925-26 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
Of these, only Indiana has no recent landlord-tenant legislation. See notes 134 and 135  supra.
The highest courts in two states have recently declined to imply a warranty in residential
leases. Osborn v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 82, 90 (Ala. 1978); Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 344,
348, 558 P.2d 563, 565-66 (1976).
16 239 N.W. 148, 149 (Minn. 1931). The court in Delarneter, a vermin infestation case,
held that the old common law rules had to be adapted to the circumstances of modern apartment
buildings, and that, in such cases, the landlord should be held to an "implied covenant that the
premises ... will be habitable." Id.May 1982)
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Foreman remained an isolated case until 1961 when it, together with Ingalls v.
Hobbs,'" an 1892 Massachusetts decision adopting the short-term furnished
lease exception,"' was cited in a Wisconsin case, Pines v. Perssion, 142 holding
that there was an implied warranty of habitability in a one-year residential
lease, and that the "covenant to pay rent and [the] covenant to provide a
habitable house were mutually dependent. „143
The case that has been the most widely cited in those jurisdictions that
have judicially adopted implied warranties or covenants of habitability is the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Javins v. First Na-
tional Realty Corp. 144 In that case, it was held that "a warranty of habitability,
measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations for the District
of Columbia, is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units
covered by those Regulations,'"'” and that breach of the implied warranty
gave rise to "the usual remedies for breach of contract"' 46 and could be used as
a defense in a rent action or eviction action for non-payment of rent. 147 The fre-
quently quoted opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright inJavins stated, before set-
ting out the common law and statutory underpinnings for an implied warranty
of habitability, that the holding inJavins reflected "a belief that leases of urban
dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract.  "148
In an aside, Judge Wright (who had been trained in the civil law in Louisiana)
noted, "The civil law has always viewed the lease as a contract, and in our
judgment that perspective has proved superior to that of the common law.  "149
Still, it was clear that legislative activity in the housing area was highly impor-
tant to the way he viewed the case. He stated that "the old no-repair rule can-
not coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern
housing code"'" and that the old rule must therefore give way to a warranty
measured by the standards set out in the District of Columbia Housing
Regulations which are deemed a part of every lease."'
Judge Wright argued, alternatively, that common law grounds alone sus-
tained the implied obligation to keep leased premises in a habitable condition.
He supported his common law argument by pointing out that the old rules had
rested on factual assumptions which were no longer valid in the modern urban
1" 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
"I Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286-87.
142 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111  N.W.2d 409 (1961).
143 Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. But see notes 159 and 160 infra.
144 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See notes 154 and 280
infra.
143 428 F.2d at 1072-73.
146 Id. at 1073.
147 Id. at 1082.
146 Id. at 1075 (footnote omitted).
146 Id. at 1075 n.13. Even inJavins, however, it was recognized that a lease could not be
treated as a contract for all purposes: "We contemplate only that contract law is to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties to the lease agreement, as between themselves."  Id.
125 Id. at 1076-77.
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housing market, and by drawing analogies to evolving consumer protection
doctrines in other areas, such as the implied warranties of quality which, he
said, had appeared in the sale or rental of personal property. 152 Commentators
have pointed out flaws in Judge Wright's reasoning and have questioned the
soundness of some of his factual assumptions," but no one can doubt the pro-
found influence the Javins case has had upon later implied warranty
decisions.'"
Javins and its progeny attracted national attention in legal circles, while
legislative reforms of the landlord-tenant relationship have tended to be the
subject of comment mainly as a local matter in the legal periodicals of the states
involved. Regardless of which legal institution took the initiative in effecting
change in landlord-tenant law, however, its further development has been the
product of court-legislature interaction, with legislation increasingly dominat-
ing the field. Since in most states it was the legislature that acted first to create
new rights and obligations or to provide new remedies,155 the question natural-
ly arose whether the legislature had so occupied the field that further judicial
expansion and innovation were impliedly precluded. To the Wisconsin
Supreme Court deciding Pines v. Perssion' 56 in 1961, the existence of some state
legislation in the area not only did not prevent the court from developing an
implied warranty, but was seen as a green light signalling the court to consider
further changes in the common law rules:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building
codes and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner
with respect to the condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made
a policy judgment—that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose
these duties on a property owner—which has rendered the old common law
rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability
in leases, would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative
policy concerning housing standards. 1'7
Legislation had thus changed the "frame of reference in which the old
common-law rule operated . . . "158
More extensive, and not entirely pro-tenant, legislation, was adopted in
Wisconsin in 1969, effective in 1971." Then, ten years after Pines, the
" 2 Id. at 1077-79. But see note 291 infra.
'" See especially Abbott, supra note 1, at 25-40. See also Cunningham, supra note 1, at
91-92, 115.18; Casenote, New Power for Tenants: The Lessee's Right to a Livable Dwelling  Javins v.
First National Realty Corp., 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193, 194-202 (1970).
'" Cunningham, supra note 1, at 77. See especially Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 627-40, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175-84, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711-20 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 356-67, 280 N.E.2d 208, 212-18 (1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hem-
ingway, 363 Mass. 184, 190-203, 293 N.E.2d 831, 838-45 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d
22, 24-33, 315 P.2d 160, 162-67 (1973).
'" Cunningham, supra note 1, at 6.
"6 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
132 Id. at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412.
" 6 Id.
" 2 Wis. STAT. ANN. $ 704.07 (West 1981).May 1982]	 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 527
Wisconsin Supreme Court, without even citing its famous earlier decision, held
in Posnanski v. Hood'60 that the Milwaukee Housing Code did not give rise to an
implied covenant in a residential lease and that violations of the Code arising
during the term of the lease could not be used as a defense to a rent action.' 6'
This holding in Posnanski was based on the court's inferences about legislative
intent. The court took the structure of the Milwaukee Code to mean that it con-
templated administrative enforcement only, since its rather vague and general
language left so much to the discretion of officials. 162 The enumeration in the
Code of official sanctions and penalties for violations was construed as implied-
ly excluding private remedies. 163 The court was influenced, too, by the fact that
other states which had recognized rent-withholding until then typically had
done so by legislation setting out clear standards, terms and conditions.'"
Ironically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Posnanski'65 drew most of these
arguments from a District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, Saunders v. First
National Realty Corp., 166 which was none other than the famous Javins case
about to make history when it was reversed only a few months later under the
name of Javins v. First National Realty Corp.' 67
A different aspect of the court-legislature problem troubled the Colorado
Supreme Court in Blackwell v. Del Bosco.'68 Acknowledging the strength of
many of the arguments in favor of abandoning the common law landlord-ten-
ant rules, the Colorado court in 1976 nevertheless declined to follow the trend
toward adopting the implied warranty of habitability. It took the position that
the issue involved such extensive finding of social and economic facts and so
much weighing and balancing of competing social interests, that its resolution
lay more properly with the elected legislature than with the judiciary.' 66 The
court also noted the need for clear and generalized rule-making in connection
with the scope and application of, as well as remedies for, implied
warranties.'" Again, in the court's view, this activity lay peculiarly within the
competence of the legislature.!''
Not all courts in jurisdictions with substantial landlord-tenant legislation
felt that their roles were restricted by the presence of statutes regulating leases.
169 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). While Pines v. Perssion is distinguishable as
involving defects present at the beginning of the term and tenants who promptly vacated,  Pines,
14,Wis. 2d at 591-93, 111 N.W.2d at 410-11, it is clear that its scope has been at least severely
limited by Posnanski.
16' 46 Wis. 2d at 181-83, 174 N.W.2d at 532-33.
162 Id. at 182, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
161
'6* Id. at 182-83, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
165 Id. at 179, 180, 182, 174 N.W.2d at 531, 532, 533.
166 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. 1968), rev 'd sub nom. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
167 Id.
166 191 Colo. 344, 558 P.2d 563 (1976).
169 Id. at 348, 558 P.2d at 565.
'7° Id.
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The most powerful argument for a court's taking up the development of an im-
plied warranty in spite of these difficulties and despite the existence of a great
variety of legislatively created tenant remedies, was developed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1973 in Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway. 172 It might have seemed that Massachusetts was an unlikely place
for a judicially developed implied warranty of habitability since few states of-
fered more tenant remedies by legislation. But the Massachusetts court made it
appear that this very legislation required it to act. The court quoted a passage
from the path-breaking article by Dean James Landis entitled Statutes and the
Sources of Law:
Doctrines of common law dealing with the relationship between in-
dividuals will often be seen to hinge upon a conception as to the positon that
one party is to occupy in our social structure. This becomes solidified into a
concept of status. But obviously status has no meaning apart from its in-
cidents. These incidents, often so numerous as to escape description, have a
varying importance in shaping the nucleus of a status. The alteration of
some of them possesses no importance beyond the change itself; the altera-
tion of others, however, may call for a radical revision of the privileges or
disabilities that have generally been attached to a particular status . . .
Changes of this nature are commonly the product of legislation. The
statutes that express them rarely directly make or alter a status as such; nor
do the statutes often see the seamlessness of the pattern that they seek to
change. '73
Applying this line of thought to the landlord-tenant relationship, the court sug-
gested that it would be irrational for the courts to continue to operate on one set
of assumptions when the legislature had shifted to another.' 74 In fact, legisla-
tion had altered the incidents of the landlord-tenant relationship to the point
where that relationship had been, at first imperceptibly, then decisively,
transformed. As a result, the court was now obliged to mold the common law to
the contours of the new relationship.
Now that legislation has become the principal mode of regulation in the
field, after nearly twenty years of innovation, the practical importance of these
institutional questions has diminished. Because of the dominance of legislation
in the area, and because the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is
fairly typical of the trends in the various state courts and legislatures,'" the
URLTA provisions will be referred to frequently below to illustrate the
presently prevailing treatment of major landlord-tenant issues, of which the
implied warranty is, of course, only one.
B. The Current Position
This section will outline the present state of landlord-tenant law in five
major areas where the departure from classical principles is most pronounced:
172 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
t" Id. at 195, 293 N.E.2d at 840-41 (quoting Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HAR-
VARD LEGAL ESSAYS 222-23 (1934)),
'4 363 Mass. at 196-97, 293 N.E,2d at 841-42.
'" Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, l I
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); Brakel, Operational Impact, supra note 134, at 1.May 1982]
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obligations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the premises; the
remedies available upon breach of such obligations; landlord's tort liability;
procedure in summary process cases; and termination of the lease. In the first
three areas, there has been fundamental change in the majority of jurisdictions
in the past twenty years, resulting in the abandonment of the classical rules and
their replacement with new starting points for legal reasoning. In the last two
areas, changes presently occurring have profoundly altered the traditional law,
but it is too soon to say what will become the predominant position.
1. Condition of the Premises
The majority of American jurisdictions, by statute or case law or both, im-
pose a duty on the landlord to deliver and maintain leased residential premises
in a fit, safe and habitable condition.' 76 The traditional law of waste has
perhaps been displaced as the standard for the residential tenant's duties with
respect to the physical condition of the premises by housing codes, statutes and
the newer case law. But the tenant is still generally required under the newer
law to refrain from injuring the leased premises and to observe certain stand-
ards of cleanliness and appropriate use. The Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act provisions are illustrative.
In tile section of the URLTA which the draftsmen describe as
"follow[ing] the warranty of habitability doctrine now recognized" in several
jurisdictions, '" the landlord's duties are set forth as follows:
Section 2.104 [Landlord to Maintain Premises]
(a) A landlord shall
(1) comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing
codes materially affecting health and safety;
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condi-
tion;
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all elec-
trical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning and other
facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be
supplied by him;
(5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for
the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the
occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and
(6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all
times and reasonable heat [between [October 1] and [May 1]] except where
the building that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be
equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat
or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of
the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection.
(b) If the duty imposed by paragraph (1) of subsection (a) is greater than
any duty imposed by any other paragraph of that subsection, the landlord's
duty shall be determined by reference to paragraph (1) of subsection (a). 178
176 The best up-to-date general survey of this aspect of landlord-tenant law is found in
Cunningham, supra note I.
I" URLTA, supra note 3, 2.104 comment.
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The minimum duties of tenants are set forth in section 3.101 of URLTA:
Section 3.101. [Tenant to Maintain Dwelling Unit.' A tenant shall
(1) comply with all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by
applicable provisions of building and housing codes materially affecting
health and safety;
(2) keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean
and safe as the condition of the premises permit;
(3) dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, garbage, rubbish, and
other waste in a dean and safe manner;
(4) keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the
tenant as clean as their condition permits;
(5) use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary,
heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances
including elevators in the premises;
(6) not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair,
or remove any part of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do
so; and
(7) conduct himself or herself and require other persons on the
premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not
disturb his neighbors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises.19
Comparison of the duties imposed upon landlords and tenants by the
URLTA with those imposed by the classical law reveals how fundamental the
change has been in this part of landlord-tenant law. While the foregoing provi-
sions of the URLTA are typical, there is considerable variation in the law of
the various jurisdictions of the United States on the respective rights and
responsibilities of landlords and tenants regarding the condition of leased
premises.'" Not all state legislatures have struck the same balance between the
interests of landlord and tenant. The ULRTA, for example, described by
American Bar Foundation researchers as "decidedly pro-tenant
legislation," 181 more often than not, has been modified in the process of gain-
ing approval by state legislatures, or by later amendment.'" The quantity of
landlord-tenant legislation to be found in the annual supplements to state
statutes is mute testimony to a continuing process of legislative adjustments in
reaction to lobbying efforts and judicial innovations in the various states.
Among those states that have abandoned classical landlord-tenant law in
the residential context, there exist significant differences with respect to the
types of dwellings covered, the determination of what constitutes habitability,
and whether or to what extent the implied warranty imposes responsibility on
the landlord for latent defects or for conditions which are outside his control. 183
It seems clear everywhere that the landlord is not responsible for conditions
caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of the tenant or persons
179 Id. S 3.101.
"° Cunningham, supra note 1, at 51-74, 81-86.
Brakel, supra note 3, at 567.
102 See the authorities collected in Cunningham, supra note 1, at 66 n.285. See also Brakel
& McIntyre, supra note 3, at 576.
" 3 Cunningham, supra note 1, at 81-95.May 1982]
	
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 531
for whose conduct the tenant is responsible, but it is less certain whether the
landlord's obligations are breached when the premises are affected by such
events as blackouts, brownouts or strikes.'" There is also great variation
among jurisdictions concerning the remedies available when landlords' or
tenants' new duties are breached.'"
Local public housing authorities would seem to be subject to the implied
warranty in jurisdictions where the warranty applies to all residential leases.'"
The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in fact chose to recognize the im-
plied warranty of habitability in a suit brought against the Boston Housing
Authority.'" But at least one state, Washington, in adopting comprehensive
landlord-tenant legislation, has expressly excluded public housing from its
coverage.' 88
As a matter of federal law, however, where the landlord is an agency of the
federal government, federal courts have not been receptive to tenants' attempts
to derive private rights of action from federal housing statutes.'" The courts
seem to be concerned about the financial impact that imposing new duties
regarding the condition of the premises would have upon already beleaguered
public housing programs. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example,
in Alexander v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 190 did not view
the national housing legislation as impliedly authorizing the judiciary to afford
private rights and remedies to tenants in a project operated by HUD. 191 On the
contrary, the programmatic character of the federal housing legislation seemed
to the court to make the adoption of an implied warranty unwise, at least before
Congress had appropriated funds for the purpose. Noting that, unlike privately
owned housing, public housing is designed to remedy unsafe and unsanitary
conditions and to increase the supply of suitable housing for low-income
184 See text and notes at notes 316-29 infra.
1" Cunningham, supra note 1, at 23-51; 98-126. See also text and notes at notes 194-214
infra.
188 E.g. , Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 712 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 466, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). The Comment to § 1.202 of the URLTA states: "This Act is in-
tended to apply to government or public agencies acting as landlords." URLTA, supra note 3, 5
1.202 comment (citation omitted).
'87 Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 190-203, 293 N.E.2d 831,
838-45 (1973). See also Coleman v. United States, 311 A.2d 496 (D.C. 1973) which extended the
benefits of Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) and Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), to public housing
tenants.
"8 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 59.18.040 (Supp. 1981).
189 Perry v. Housing Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1213-18 (4th Cir. 1981);
Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509-11 (1st Cir. 1979).  But see Silva v. East Providence
Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464-65 (D.R.I. 1976), remanded, 565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1977).
1" 555 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1977), gird, 441 U.S. 39, 67 (1979). The tenants did not
challenge the Seventh Circuit's ruling on the implied warranty issue in their appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 441 U.S. at 45 n.5.
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families, the court apparently feared that an implied warranty would amount
to a wholly unrealistic representation "that the stated objectives of national
policy have been and are being met." 192 The court indicated its awareness of
political realities in its discussion of the national housing goals:
We fail to see how these objectives [a decent home and a suitable living en-
vironment for every American family] can be interpreted to impose upon
HUD or its agent an absolute, fixed obligation to maintain suitable dwell-
ings. Moreover, like many declarations of Congressional policy, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1441 sets forth broad future objectives on a grand scale which are to be ac-
complished over a period of many years.'"
In view of the special circumstances and character of public housing, federal
courts have been chary of importing into federal law private rights analogous to
those that many state courts have accepted.
2. Remedies
Court decisions recognizing implied warranties of habitability have
generally extended to the tenant all of the usual contract remedies for breach of
warranty.'" The courts also have generally agreed that the implied warranty
and the tenant's obligation to pay rent are mutually dependent, and that one
consequence of this interdependence is that breach of the warranty entitles the
tenant to terminate, or, in contract language, to rescind, the lease.'95 Since ter-
mination requires the tenant to vacate the leased premises this remedy alone
would represent little advance, from a tenant's point of view, over the tradi-
tional doctrine of constructive eviction. Where the defects in the premises are
relatively minor, many states, usually by statute, have made available the self-
help remedy of rent application, introduced in the nineteenth century Field
civil codes. "Repair-and-deduct," as it is commonly known, permits the ten-
ant upon proper notice to correct the problem and deduct the reasonable cost
thereof from the rent. 196
The most dramatic remedial innovation, however, has been the authoriza-
tion, in most implied warranty jurisdictions, of rent-withholding by a tenant
who remains in possession. The extent of this departure from traditional
landlord-tenant law is apparent when it is recalled that at common law, the
tenant's only remedy for breach of a landlord's covenant, with the exception of
the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, was in contract."' Even when the
courts began to permit the landlord's failure to perform his obligations with
192 Id.
193 Id.
19* E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
126 E.g., Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843
(1973).
196 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 111, § 127L (West Supp. 1981). The total amount
that can be deducted is usually limited by statute.
197 See text and notes at notes 58-59 supra,May 1982]	 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 533
respect to the condition of the premises to be treated as a breach of the covenant
for quiet enjoyment, the doctrine of constructive eviction did not allow the ten-
ant to withhold rent while remaining in possession. If the tenant did engage in
such a "rent strike," traditional summary process law permitted the landlord
to evict him for nonpayment of rent even though the landlord had breached his
own obligations.'98 Summary process law did not permit the landlord's breach
to be set off or raised by way of defense or counterclaim in actions for posses-
sion based on nonpayment of rent.
Today, however, most implied warranty jurisdictions permit the tenant to
plead such a breach as a defense in an eviction action, because the breach is
considered germane to the question of whether any rent is owing to the
landlord by the tenant.'" But since rent withholding denies the landlord both
income and the use of his income-producing asset, the remedy is often carefully
circumscribed with preconditions and safeguards, particularly where, as is
usually the case, it is regulated by statute. 20° Various jurisdictions have worked
out different approaches to the questions of what is to be done with the
withheld rent during the pendency of litigation; how the court is to determine
whether, or how much, rent is owing to the landlord in cases where the
landlord is found to have breached his obligations; and how damages, if any,
are to be computed."'
The remedial scheme of URLTA is illustrative of all the principal trends
just described. New substantive duties like those set forth in section 2.104 of
URLTA202 are the foundation for tenant claims, counterclaims, and defenses
when the landlord breaches his obligations with respect to the condition of the
premises. Any noncompliance by the landlord with the Act or the lease also
may give rise to actions for actual damages and injunctive relief. 203 A material
breach of such obligations, or of lease provisions, if it affects health and safety,
entitles the tenant, upon proper notice, to terminate the lease if the landlord
does not act promptly to remedy the conditions. 204 The tenant's remedies,
however, are not limited to those which require him to bring a lawsuit or to
vacate the leased premises. Where the defects involved are relatively minor,
the tenant has the alternative of correcting the condition himself and deducting
the actual and reasonable cost from the rent. 2°5 Safeguards for the landlord are
provided by requiring the tenant to give the landlord notice and a reasonable
opportunity to make the repair and by limiting the amount that can be
deducted for the reasonable cost of the repair. The suggested maximum in the
198
(1972).
See, e.g., the Oregon statute described in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65-66
"4 Id, 5 4.101(a).
205 Id. 5 4.103.
1981).
199 E.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 358, 280 N.E.2d 208, 213 (1972).
2" E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 111, 55 127C-H and ch. 239, 8A (West Supp.
2°' Cunningham, supra note 1, at 23-51; 100-09; 113-26.
2" See note 178 supra.
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Act is $100 or one-half of the periodic rent, whichever is greater. An alternative
set of remedies is available if the landlord's breach involves the willful or
negligent failure to supply such essential services as water, electricity, or heat
where the rental agreement or the Act requires him to do so. 206 In such cases,
upon proper notice, the tenant may procure the services himself, deducting
their actual and reasonable cost, without limit, from the rent. Alternatively,
the Act allows the tenant to recover damages for the diminished rental value of
the premises; or he may procure interim substitute housing at the landlord's
expense up to the value of the periodic rent without liability for rent during the
period of the landlord's breach.
The tenant in possession is also afforded the important option of raising
the landlord's breach of obligations under the rental agreement or the Act as a
defense to, or counterclaim in, an action for rent or for possession for nonpay-
ment of rent."' The Act seeks to protect the landlord's interests, in such cases,
by authorizing the court to order the tenant to pay all or part of the accrued
rent into court and to award attorney's fees to the landlord where the defense
or counterclaim is found to have been frivolous or in bad faith. The Act also
makes clear that a tenant's liability for rent does not continue when he vacates
premises that are substantially destroyed by fire or other casualty. 208
Where it is the tenant who breaches his obligations under the rental agree-
ment or the Act, the landlord is given a parallel set of remedies. The landlord is
permitted to seek actual damages and injunctive relief for any noncompliance
with the rental agreement or the tenant's duties under the Act. 2{}9 Where the
tenant's breach is a material one, the landlord may terminate the rental agree-
ment upon proper notice after the tenant has had a reasonable opportunity to
correct the situation,21° the notice period required being shorter if the tenant's
breach is a recurring one or if it consists of nonpayment of rent.'" Where the
tenant's breach is one that materially affects health and safety and can be
remedied by repair and the tenant has failed to act to do so within a reasonable
time, the landlord is permitted upon notice to make the repair himself and to
bill the tenant for actual and reasonable cost thereof. 2' 2 In cases where the ten-
ant abandons the leased premises, the landlord is obliged to make reasonable
efforts to mitigate damages by renting them at a fair renta1.213
In addition to remedies for breach of statutory or judicially implied war-
ranties of habitability, state statutes and codes may impose a wide variety of
additional duties upon landlords, accompanied by an equally varied set of
publicly and privately enforced sanctions.'" In sum, it can be said that the new
206 Id.	 4.104.
207 Id, S 4.105.
2" Id. S 4.106.
209 Id.	 4.201(c).
21° Id. 5 4.201(a).
211 Id. 5 4.201(b).
212 Id. 5 4.202.
219 Id. 5 4.203(c).
214 See id. 5 2.101, regulating the taking and use of security deposits;  id. 5 2.102 requir-May 1982]
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remedial scheme, as expressed in the URLTA, substantially expands the
avenues of recourse open to a tenant, and presents the appearance of
equilibrium by offering a parallel set of remedies to lessors.
3. Landlord's Tort Liability
The modern proliferation of statutory provisions imposing duties on
landlords to maintain leased premises in fit, safe and habitable condition has
greatly expanded the landlord's potential tort liability to persons injured
because of defective conditions on the premises. Increasingly, as already men-
tioned, the landlord's violation of a safety statute is treated as evidence of
negligence;215 and in some states it is negligence per se.215 The wide acceptance
of the implied covenant or warranty of habitability has still further eroded the
landlord's common law immunity from tort suits by persons injured on leased
property. Once tort actions based on the violation of an express covenant to
repair were permitted and privity requirements were eliminated, the stage was
set for the landlord to be liable to suit in tort where the cause of the injury was
also the subject of an implied convenant.2"
The natural culmination of all this movement in the exceptions to the
common law immunity rule was the abandonment of the rule itself in the 1973
New Hampshire case of Sargeant v. Ross.215 Declining to go through the exercise
of torturing the facts of the case to fit them into one of the common law excep-
tions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the landlord's liability in
tort was to be established with reference to the same principle that governed
personal injury cases generally, namely, the standard of due care. 219 The
landlord's former immunity was abolished, and the traditional exceptions to it
became factors to consider in determining whether the landlord had exercised
reasonable care under all the circumstances of the case. 22°
A few courts have gone beyond Sargeant v. Ross. These courts hold that the
landlord's breach of an implied warranty or of statutory duties to maintain
leased premises imposes strict liability for resulting injuries.22' In such jurisdic-
tions, the tenant need neither show that the landlord knew of the defect nor that
he was negligent, but merely that a statutory duty or the implied warranty was
ing disclosure of certain information relating to the ownership and management of the premises;
see text and notes at notes 339-61 infra.
216
	 authorities cited in note 115 supra.
216 E.g., Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981).
217
	 v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 225-31, 412 A.2d 436, 442-45 (1980).
218
	 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
2" Id. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534.
220 	 at 398-99, 308 A.2d at 534-35.
221 E. . g, Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 751-52, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634, 638-39 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1976) (landlord strictly liable for breach of implied warranty); Krennerich v. WCG
Inv. Corp., 278 So. 2d 842, 845 (La. 1973) (landlord strictly liable for breach of statutory duty to
maintain premises); Hawkins v. Clark, 294 So. 2d 259, 260 (La. 1974) (landlord strictly liable
even where defects are latent). But cf. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48,
52, 301 A.2d 463, 465 (App. Div.), aff'd, 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973) (per curiam) (landlord
is not an insurer; notice and proof of negligence are prerequisite to liability).536	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
breached and that injury resulted. It seems unlikely, however, that a majority
of jurisdictions will convert the landlord's traditional immunity into a
presumptive liability. Sargeant v. Ross seems more likely to appeal to courts in
other implied warranty jurisdictions because it not only brings landlord-tenant
tort law into harmony with tort law generally, but it also provides a good
framework for working out complex multi-party tort problems where both ten-
ant and landlord have breached duties potentially giving rise to liability to third
persons injured on the premises. 222 Gradually, in cases involving residential
tenancies, in jurisdictions where landlords are subject to duties of repair, the
courts seem to be looking to Sargeant v. Ross in abolishing the old rule of no-
liability and in holding landlords to the duty of acting reasonably under the cir-
cumstances.223
This trend is likely to continue. The old tort law cannot stand together
with the new implied warranty law, any more than the old rule of caveat emp-
tor can coexist with the reallocation of the rights and duties between landlord
and tenant under modern landlord-tenant legislation. However, the coverage
of implied warranties, as well as that of state laws and codes which have played
such a key role in the expansion of landlord tort liability, is usually expressly
limited to residential tenancies. Thus it cannot be assumed that landlords' tort
liability in commercial, industrial, and agricultural contexts will be altered so
profoundly as it has been where human shelter is involved. The due care stan-
dard may well come to replace the traditional landlord's partial immunity
generally, but what constitutes "due care" will depend very much on what
duties have been imposed by law on landlords. In non-residential contexts,
those duties are much less extensive than where habitation is involved.
4. Reforms of Summary Process
As the previous three subsections demonstrate, dramatic changes have oc-
curred in residential landlord-tenant law with respect to the landlord's respon-
sibility for the physical condition of the premises, his liability in tort, and the
remedies available to tenants for breach of express and implied covenants. The
possessory remedy of summary process, or forcible entry and detainer, as it is
called in some states, has also undergone profound changes in the process. To
the extent that material breach of the landlord's obligations with respect to the
condition of leased premises has been made available as a defense in eviction
actions, the very basis of traditional summary process law has been under-
mined. Just as landlord-tenant tort law had become an anomaly within the
body of modern tort law, so nineteenth century summary proceedings were
islands of anachronism within streamlined modern civil procedure law. They
222 See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976);
Brown v. Pasternak, 92 Misc. 2d 347, 399 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
223 Brennan v. Cockrell [rm., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122,
124-25 (1973); Young v. Garwacki, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 729, 735-38, 402 N.E.2d 1045,
1049-51; Pagelsdorff v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734, 742-45, 284 N.W.2d 55,
59-61 (1979).May 1982]
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were constitutional, however, as the United States Supreme Court made clear
in its 1972 decision, Lindsey v. Normet. 224 The Court there upheld Oregon's
traditional summary procedure law, even though the statute limited the issues
that could be litigated in a possession action to whether the tenant had paid the
rent, had held over wrongfully or had honored his covenants. 225 According to
the majority opinion, a state can validly single out possessory actions by
landlords against tenants for especially expedited judicial settlement because of
the "unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship."226 These features were described by the Court as follows:
The tenant is, by definition, in possession of the property of the landlord;
unless a judicially supervised mechanism is provided for what would other-
wise be swift repossession by the landlord himself, the tenant would be able
to deny the landlord the rights of income incident to ownership by refusing
to pay rent and by preventing sale or rental to someone else. Many ex-
penses of the landlord continue to accrue whether a tenant pays his rent or
not. Speedy adjudication is desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to
undeserved economic loss and the tenant to unmerited harrassment and
dispossession when his lease or rental agreement gives him the right to
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. 227
The practical effect of Lindsey in an implied warranty state which has not
modernized its summary process law would be that a tenant in default in his
rental obligation could be permitted to raise a habitability defense in an action
for rent but denied this opportunity in an action for possession only. Landlords
of low-income tenants could be expected to forego bringing actions for prob-
ably uncollectible past-due rent, and to content themselves with regaining
possession. Thus, there. would be few occasions for litigating habitability
issues.
That a state is not constitutionally required to permit a tenant to raise
habitability issues in an eviction action for nonpayment for rent, however, has
not prevented most implied warranty states, including Oregon one year after
the Lindsey case, from electing to furnish tenants with this opportunity. 
228 The
Oregon statute was inspired by the URLTA. The draftsmen's comment to
URLTA section 4.105, which permits the habitability defense in possession ac-
tions, states that it "is consistent with modern procedure reform in permitting
the tenant to file a counterclaim or other appropriate pleading in the summary
proceeding to the end that all issues between the parties may be disposed of in
one proceeding. "229
2" 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
225 Id. at 64.
226 Id. at 72.
227 Id. at 72-73.
228 Robbins, The New Oregon Landlord-Tenant Act and the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act — A Comparison, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 327, 327-28 (1973). See also Green v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 620, 631-37, 517 P.2d 1168, 1170, 1178-82, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
706, 714-18 (1974); jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 140, 265 A.2d 526, 531 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d
22, 31, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 131 (W. Va. 1978).
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The increased willingness of courts and legislatures to permit the
habitability defense in possession actions has focussed attention on the need to
strike a proper balance between the tenant's legitimate desire to resolve rent-
related disputes before losing possession of his home, and the landlord's
legitimate desire to continue to receive the rental income from which debt
service, operating expenses and repairs would ordinarily be paid. One solution
was suggested by theJavins opinion, in which Judge Wright endorsed the prac-
tice of requiring the tenant to deposit all or part of the rent money with the
court.23° Statutes authorizing rent-withholding usually provide for such
deposits and often prescribe the circumstances under which rent money so
deposited may be used for repairs or other expenses relating to the property. 231
Modernizing the procedure in eviction cases is not, however, an entirely
simple matter because of the special features of the landlord-tenant relationship
alluded to by the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normee. The hearing of the ten-
ant's defenses may prolong litigation for a considerable period of time during
which the landlord may receive no rent while his expenses continue to accrue.
At the end of the lawsuit, the court may find that the tenant owes the entire
rent, but the landlord may be unable to collect it if it has not been deposited in
court.
Professor Richard Chused, drawing both on the history of summary proc-
ess and on modern civil procedure law, has outlined what seems to be a prom-
ising way to deal with the conflicting legitimate interests of landlord and ten-
ant.232 Like other elements of classical landlord-tenant law, summary process
was, it seems, often tempered in practice by the courts. If a tenant requested a
preliminary injunction against dispossession,"s'ome courts were willing to use
their equitable powers to intervene."' Chused's suggestion is that tenants to-
day, in keeping with modern practice, should be allowed routinely to plead a
wide variety of defenses and counterclaims in possession actions, but that they
should be allowed to delay eviction only when they can make the kind of show-
ing of irreparable harm and likelihood of success that a litigant ordinarily has to
make in order to obtain a preliminary injunction." 4 At the hearing on the ten-
ant's motion for delay, the court would have to balance the equities, consider-
ing the landlord's need for possession and the tenant's defense. If the court
concluded that the eviction should be delayed, it could require the tenant to
post security for the delay, by analogy to the requirement of posting a bond for
a preliminary injunction.
While Professor Chused's proposal may indicate a way to harmonize pro-
cedure in eviction cases with civil procedure law and the new framework of
"° javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
2" E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127C-H (West Supp. 1981).
232 Chused, supra note 130.
2" Id. at 1399.
234 Id. at 1399-1400.May 1982]
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landlord-tenant law, another problem raised by the habitability defense is not
so easily resolved. Although defenses relating to the condition of leased
premises are raised in only a minority of all eviction cases, 235 they quickly put a
considerable strain on the over-burdened judicial system. 236 One reponse to
this burden has been the creation of special courts for dealing with housing or
landlord-tenant matters.237 But the nature of landlord-tenant litigation, with its
high volume, each case typically involving a small amount of money, has sug-
gested to some observers that alternatives to the judicial method of dispute
resolution should be explored in this area. 2" Various experiments with media-
tion and conciliation are underway, many of them under the auspices of
specialized housing courts. 239
There is yet another aspect of the new defenses to eviction that needs to be
explored. Traditionally, there was no question but that when a lease expired by
its terms or was properly terminated, the landlord had the right to possession of
"his" property. Indeed, one of the concerns of the United States Supreme
Court in Lindsey v. Norinet24° was that the habitability defense could operate to
extend the tenancy beyond its term, thus interfering with property rights of the
landlord. The Court stated, "[T]he Constitution does not authorize us to re-
quire that the term of an otherwise expired tenancy be extended while the ten-
ant's damage claims against the landlord are litigated."24' Since Lindsey,
through the action of state courts and legislatures, tenancies now can be ex-
tended, often for long periods of time, while issues between landlord and ten-
ant are litigated. This raises the question of whether the principle of "security
of tenure" has been indirectly introduced into the law relating to lease termina-
tion.
5. Security of Tenure
Traditionally, continuity of tenure has been a characteristic that set
freehold ownership apart from mere leasing. In the classical scheme, it was un-
questioned that the landlord had the right to possession of the leased premises
upon the expiration of a term of years or upon the proper termination of a
tenancy at will or a periodic tenancy. The right was absolute in principle
23' Abbott, supra note 1, at 63-64; Brake], supra note 3, at 586.
236 Greene, A Proposal for the Establishment of a District of Columbia Landlord-Tenant Agency,
38 D.C.B.J. 25, 26 (1971); Gerwin, supra note 129, at 642.
2" See the articles on housing courts in 17 URB. L. ANN. 3-227 (1979).
238 Gerwin, supra note 129, at 722-51; the articles on housing courts in 17 URB. L. ANN.
227-371 (1979); McIntyre, URLTA in Operation: The Ohio Experience, 1980 Am. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 587, 606; Stanley, President's Page, 62 A.B.A. J. 1071, 1071, 1190 (1976).
Landlord-tenant disputes are specifically mentioned as in need of more adequate dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms in the preamble to the Dispute Resolution Act, Feb. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-190, 94 Stat. 17, reprinted in 28 U,S.C.A. App. § 2 (West Supp. 1981).
239 See, e.g. , the description of the operation of the Boston Housing Court in Garrity, The
Boston Housing Court: An Encouraging Response to Complex Issues, 17 URB. L. ANN. 15 (1979).
"° 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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because the landlord could thus terminate or refuse to renew a leasehold estate
for any reason or for no reason; evidence concerning his motives was inad-
missible. 242
As with other classical rules, however, one must be aware that the com-
mon law rules on termination of leases could be and often were relaxed in prac-
tice. The courts could use their equitable powers, as well as techniques of con-
struing lease provisions, to mitigate the harshest effects.'" Furthermore, sum-
mary process statutes typically contain provisions for waiting periods and for
judicial discretion to stay eviction244 which can and often do substantially in-
crease the time and expense required to remove a tenant. In recent years,
outright exceptions to the termination rules have begun to appear as otherwise
lawful terminations of leases have been forbidden under various cir-
cumstances. The landlord's right to possession upon termination of the lease
gradually has begun to be qualified by the idea that landlords cannot evict or
terminate for certain "bad," or proscribed reasons. Thus, for example, a
landlord cannot terminate or refuse to rent in violation of federal and state civil
rights laws that protect tenants against discrimination based on race, color,
sex, religion, national origin,'" and, in some places, marital status or the
presence of children in the household.'"
Many of the new rights acquired by tenants as landlord-tenant law was
transformed in the 1960's and 1970's could have been virtually nullified if
landlords could terminate or refuse to renew the leases of tenants who exercised
them. Month-to-month tenants, who tend to be found mainly in low-rental
units, were especially vulnerable, since their leases in principle can be ended
upon 30 days' notice for any or no reason. So, largely as a byproduct of the
development of the implied warranty, statutory and case law began to inhibit
landlords from using their prerogatives to terminate tenancies, or to raise
rents, or to refuse to renew leases, in reprisal for the exercise of the tenant's
right to participate in tenants' unions or to assert defenses based on the
landlord's failure to maintain the premises."' In the leading case of Edwards v.
Habib,'" Judge Wright held unlawful a landlord's termination of a month-to-
month tenancy in retaliation for a tenant's reporting code violations on the
premises. 249
The creation of the retaliatory eviction exception to the common law ter-
mination rules generated a new set of legal problems. What kind of evidence
242 1 TIFFANY, supra note 27, 5 13(b) at 111, 5 14(e) at 139-40; CASNER & LEACH, supra
note 57, at 533.
243 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5 88 at 135-36 (2d ed. 1939).
2-44
•n	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, 5 12, ch. 238, 5 9 (West Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 5 2A:42-I0.6 (West Supp. 1981).
245 E.g. , 42 U.S.C. 55 1982, 3601-3619, 3631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
246 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, 4(6), (11) (West Supp. 1981).
2" Cunningham, supra note 1, at 126-38.
248 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
246 Id. at 699-701.May 1982]	 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 541
would satisfy the tenant's burden of proof on the issue of retaliatory motive?
What if the evidence suggested mixed motives, including some legitimate
reason, such as nonpayment of rent? If the eviction was found to be retaliatory,
how long would the landlord have to wait before regaining possession of the
premises? In resolving these issues, legislatures and courts have generally
resorted to the use of presumptions. The following section of URLTA is
typical:
Section 5.101. [Retaliatory Conduct Prohibited. ]
(a) Except as provided in this section, a landlord may not retaliate by
increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring
an action for possession after:
(1) the tenant has complained to a governmental agency charged
with responsibility for enforcement of a building or housing code of a viola-
tion applicable to the premises materially affecting health and safety; or
(2) the tenant has complained to the landlord of a violation [of the
landlord's obligations to maintain the premises]; or
(3) the tenant has organized or become a member of a tenant's
union or similar organization.
(b) If the landlord acts in violation of subsection (1), the tenant . . has
a defense in any retaliatory action against him for possession. In an action
by or against the tenant, evidence of a complaint within [1] a year before
the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's con-
duct was in retaliation. The presumption does not arise if the tenant made
the complaint after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution of serv-
ices. "Presumption" means that the trier of fact must find the existence of
the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would sup-
port a finding of its nonexistence.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and.(b), a landlord may bring an
action for possession if:
(1) the violation of the applicable building or housing code was
caused primarily by lack of reasonable care by the tenant, a member of his
family, or other person on the premises with his consent; or
(2) the tenant is in default in rent; or
(3) compliance with the applicable building or housing code requires
alteration, remodeling, or demolition which would effectively deprive the
tenant of use of the dwelling unitY°
Thus, under the URLTA, if the tenant engaged in a protected activity within
one year of the alleged retaliatory act, a presumption of retaliation arises unless
the tenant's complaint was itself preceded by a notice of a rent increase or a
service cut-back. The landlord is protected if the tenant is chargeable with
responsibility for the code violation complained of or is in default on, as distinct
from lawfully withholding, his rent, or if required repairs would displace the
tenant in any event.
In general, as under the URLTA, states that have modernized their
landlord-tenant law now permit tenants who get notices of eviction after report-
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ing housing code violations, joining a tenant's union, or exercising their rights
to withhold rent or to repair and deduct, to remain on the premises unless the
eviction was primarily motivated by some other "good" cause, such as willful
damage to the premises or unjustifiable nonpayment of rent. 2" Legislation,
rather than judicial decisions, predominates in this area. Some of this legisla-
tion is more solicitous of the landlord's interest in regaining possession of the
leased premises; some, like the URLTA, is more tenant oriented.
Recently, in several states and municipalities, further limitations have
been placed on evictions. Reacting to the loss of rental units caused by their
conversion into cooperatives or condominiums, a number of legislatures have
severely curtailed the ability of landlords to terminate or refuse to renew ex-
isting tenancies for this purpose.252 Even without legislation, the case law
developments could go quite far in the direction of limiting the landlord's abili-
ty to terminate tenancies. The increasing disposition of courts to carry new and
old principles of contract law over into residential lease law, together with the
"good faith" clause in URLTA section 1.302, 253 modelled on the Uniform
Commercial Code's section 1-203, 251 might well result in holding landlords to a
standard of good faith that would be much broader in scope than the retaliatory
eviction concept.
All of the foregoing exceptions to common law lease termination rules
have involved an increase in security of tenure arising from the prohibition of
evictions, or refusals to renew, for forbidden reasons. In the absence of such
proscribed reasons, landlords remain in principle free to evict or refuse to
renew for any reason they wish. Certain other developments, however, at pres-
ent rather limited in scope, would prevent landlords from terminating or refus-
ing to renew leases unless they affirmatively can show "good reasons" for so
doing. "Good cause" eviction is not an exception to the landlord's common law
right to repossess at the end of a term. It constitutes rather the introduction of
an opposite principle, that of the tenant's presumptive right to continue in
possession.
A "good cause" requirement for eviction exists already where the dwell-
ings involved are in public housing programs, in most rent-controlled tenan-
cies, and applies to virtually all rental housing in two jurisdictions. Tenants in
conventional public housing or federally subsidized rental housing are pro-
tected against eviction by administrative rules and regulations affording them
the right, not only to security of tenure, but to a hearing on the reasons for evic-
25 ' See generally Cunningham, supra note 1, at 126-38.
252 See text at notes 339-54 infra. Typically, such legislation is at the municipal rather
than the state level. For a description of various types of statutes and ordinances, see Note, The
Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversion,  78 MICH. L. REV. 124 (1979).
252 "Every duty under this Act and every act which must be performed as a condition
precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement." URLTA 1.302.
254 "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance or enforcement." U.C.C. 5 1-203 (1978).May 1982]
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tion before they are deprived of possession. 255 Some courts have suggested that
the rights of such tenants to such a hearing may be of constitutional
dimension,255 analogous.to a welfare recipient's right to a hearing before losing
public assistance benefits. 2" Private landlords participating in federal rent sub-
sidy programs may also be subject to good cause requirements for terminating
leases.258 In the private, but rent-controlled, sector, local regulations typically
provide that a landlord can terminate a controlled tenancy only for "just
cause," that is, for one of the statutorily enumerated reasons. 259 New Jersey,
since 1974, and the District of Columbia, since 1975, have had highly in-
novative laws, little noticed outside those jurisdictions, forbidding evictions ex-
cept for statutorily enumerated reasons. The protection of the District of Col-
umbia act extends to all rental units,26° and that of the New Jersey statute to all
private tenants except those in owner-occupied two-family dwellings. 26' By
"emergency" legislation in 1982, the District of Columbia Code was amended
to prohibit temporarily evictions on days when the temperature is not predicted
to exceed 20 degrees Fahrenheit. 262
At present the revolution in landlord-tenant law has stopped short of
establishing a good cause requirement for lease terminations on a general basis
in the United States. The majority of jurisdictions seem to have settled, rather,
on a system of forbidding evictions for certain proscribed causes. However, if
retaliation is easily presumed and the presumption is difficult to rebut or
dispel, the distinction between retaliatory eviction and "good cause" eviction
diminishes. Furthermore, if lists of proscribed causes generally expand to in-
clude reasons such as the landlord's desire to change the form of his investment
from rental housing to some other use, this will effectively nullify a principle
that once was at the very heart of landlord-tenant law. Meanwhile, in the
District of Columbia and New Jersey, in the public sector, and under most rent
control regulations, it can be said that the very nature of a term of years has
252 24 C.F.R. 55 450.3, 866.4, 866.50-.59 (1981). See also Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 274-84 (1969).
256 See Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861, 867 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
257 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
268 H.U.D. regulations do not expressly provide for "good cause" eviction in the case of
tenants of landlords participating in the Section 8 "existing housing" program, but a good cause
standard was applied in Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 364-67 (W.D.N.C.
1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Heen, Due Process Protections for Tenants in Sec-
tion 8 Assisted Housing: Prospects for a Good Cause Eviction Standard, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1,
11-16 (1978).
259 C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE: CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 173 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP]. See, e.g.,
Driscoll v. Harrison, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 434, 438, 417 N.E.2d 26, 29.  See also R.
ScHoSHiNsKi, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5 7:10 at 528-30 (1980).
26° D.C. CODE ANN. 5 45-156 (1981).
26' 	 STAT. ANN. 5 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1981).
262 Act 4-143, amending D.C. Code 45-1561, effective Jan. 20, 1982, expiring April
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already been changed. It is no longer an estate which must come to an end at or
before a fixed or determinable time.
Even now, the retaliatory eviction cases and the condominium conversion
control laws show that the "sticks in the bundle of rights" that compose the
property interest in a leasehold have been reallocated between landlord and
tenant. To the extent that termination by the landlord has become more dif-
ficult through case law, legislation, and even through the informal practices of
trial judges and constables who in some places are reluctant to put tenants out
on the street, the landlord's interest begins to resemble what property lawyers
call a bare reversion, while the tenant acquires rights to continuity beyond the
present possessory interest. The greater these rights, the more the tenant's in-
terest looks like a new form of determinable life estate, created by operation of
law. Thus, one of the principal distinctions between freehold ownership and
leasing begins to disappear.
These developments reflect a certain incorporation into the law of the no-
tions that the tenant's interest in his home and the public's interest in main-
taining the supply of rental units are more important than the landlord's in-
vestment. This was made explicit by Judge Wright in Robinson v. Diamond
Housing, 263 a retaliatory eviction case: "The right to a decent home is far too
vital for us to assume that government has taken away with one hand with
summary process] what it purports to grant with the other [tenants' rights]. "264
Some courts, like the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet, 265 may still refer
to the landlord as the "owner" and to the leased dwelling as the landlord's
"property."266 But in conventional property law terms, a leasehold estate
always involves at least two proprietary interests: the present possessory estate
of the tenant and the reversion of the landlord. 267 What seems to be happening
at present is that the traditional emphasis on what the landlord owns is now
giving way to an increased emphasis on what the tenant owns. That these
developments can go quite far in a common law country is shown by the ex-
perience of England where broad legislative schemes of rent regulation and
eviction control have been in operation since the post-war period. 268 Although
263 Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
264 Id. at 862.
265 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
266 Id. at 72, 74.
267 In the takings context, federal courts are well aware of the proprietary nature of a
tenant's interest. E.g., Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 141 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[L]easehold in-
terests are property interests protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
265 In England, with certain exceptions, a tenant whose leasehold is protected by the
Rent Act cannot be evicted unless a statutory ground (e.g., non-payment of rent) exists and the
court finds the eviction is "reasonable" under all the circumstances. Rent Act 1977 (1977 c.42),
Part VII § 98. Agricultural tenants have secure tenure under the Agricultural Holdings Act,
1948, and Agricultural Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act, 1977.
General rent regulation and statutory protection against eviction without good cause is
common throughout Western Europe. E.g.: France: Law No. 48-1360 of 1 Sept. 1948; Code de
la Construction et de ]'Habitation, Article 613-1 et seq., as amended by the Law of 1 DecemberMay 1982]
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most English texts treat the "statutory tenancies" created by these laws as con-
sisting of merely personal, not proprietary, rights, the tenant's continuing right
to possession is considered by some commentators to be a new kind of property
right.269 In the United States, it is already clear that with respect to lease ter-
mination, as with the other areas we have examined, technical change in
landlord-tenant law has been accompanied by subtle ideological change. The
nature of that change is explored further in the following sections.
IV. THE RISE OF REGULATORY LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
The differences between the legal norms that presently govern a
transformed residential landlord-tenant relationship in most American states
and those of the classical law are striking. But the essence of the transformation
of lease law is not revealed merely by comparing classical and current law or by
tracing the evolution and decline of various substantive and procedural rules.
From one angle, the twentieth century evolution of landlord-tenant law has in-
volved the absorption into lease law of new principles of contract, sales, tort
and civil procedure law as those fields themselves have been modernized. From
this point of view, landmark cases removing such anomalies as the in-
dependence of covenants, the landlord's tort immunity and the limitation on
rent-related defenses and counterclaims in eviction actions have simply made
lease law more consistent with other fields of private law. As new doctrines
within contract, tort and commercial law began to accord consumers different
legal treatment in many respects from that given to merchants, residential
landlord-tenant law has diverged from commercial landlord-tenant law to
become a kind of "consumer law."27°
The growing dichotomy between commercial and residential lease law is
quite marked in recent decisions of the New York Court of Appeals. In cases
involving commercial leases, the court has stressed the dual nature of a lease as
contract and conveyance.2" It asserted in 1979 that "[w]hile . a lease is
1951; the Law of 4 January 1980, and the Decree of 8 January 1980. West Germany:  see generally
Schmidt-Fiitterer, Wohnraumschutzgesetz, Kiindigung, Mieterhijhung, Mietwucher, Zweck-
entfremdung, 2nd ed. (Munich: Beck, 1976). The Swedish situation is described in The Swedish
Institute, Housing and Housing Policy in Sweden, Fact Sheets on Sweden (1978).
269 Recent cases broadly construing this legislation have been viewed by Dr. Kevin Gray
of Cambridge as advancing "the idea that residential tenants may have 'social rights of property'
in their homes and that these rights prevail over strict legal entitlements as defined by the or-
thodox law of property or as fixed by contract between landlord and tenant." Gray, Lease or
License to Evade the Rent Act?, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 38, 42 (1979). See generally K. GRAY & P.
SYMES, REAL PROPERTY AND REAL PEOPLE: PRINCIPLES OF LAND LAW 415 -59 (1981).
272 Consumer protection theories figure prominently in several implied warranty cases.
See, e.g., javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626-27, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174-75, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 710-11 (1974). See also Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N. J. Super. 477,
484, 268 A.2d 556, 560 (1970).
271 Geraci v. Jenrette, 41 N.Y.2d 660, 665, 363 N.E.2d 559, 563, 394 N.Y.S.2d 853,
856-57 (1977); 219 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 506, 509-11, 387 N.E.2d546	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
often chameleonic in both character and function, its fundamental purpose re-
mains to serve as a vehicle for the conveyance of an interest in real
property. "2" The same year, however, echoing Javins, the court described a
residential lease as "more akin to a purchase of shelter and services rather than
a conveyance of an estate. . . . " 2" The URLTA is by its terms applicable only
to dwelling units, 274 as are the various state statutes giving tenants new rights
and remedies relating to habitability. Although there are few cases on the sub-
ject, courts in implied warranty states have signalled to commercial tenants
that they cannot count on having the new rules developed in residential lease
cases applied to them."'
As the new residential landlord-tenant law matures, the analogy between
a lease and a sale of goods, so influential in the early development of the im-
plied warranty, has begun to break down. The appearance, establishment,
elaboration, and eventual transmutation of the implied warranty could furnish
a series of textbook illustrations for Edward Levi's discussion of how new con-
cepts enter the legal system, change the prior law, and are themselves changed.
Levi called attention to the importance of finding a "ready word" or phrase for
a new legal concept."' He notes that, looking back over a line of cases, one can
often discern a period when the courts were fumbling for a phrase."' In
landlord-tenant law, a new characterization of the subject matter of the trans-
action was needed to enable it to escape from classical legal categories. The
lack of such a characterization, in part,?" explains why the Minnesota
Supreme Court's recognition in 1931 of a landlord's "implied covenant that
the premises [in modern apartment buildings] will be habitable" 279 attracted
little attention at the time. Eventually, when circumstances had changed suffi-
ciently to make a thorough restructuring of landlord-tenant law possible, Judge
1205, 1206-07, 414 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890-91 (N.Y.C.A. 1979).
222 219 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 387 N.E.2d 1205,
1207, 414 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (N.Y.C.A. 1979).
2" Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 324, 391 N.E.2d 1288,
1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (1979).
2" URLTA, supra note 3, SS 1.201, 1.202.
2" E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 556-57, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1980); Interstate
Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108, 110 (D.C. 1973); J.B. Stein & Co. v. Sand-
berg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 19, 26, 419 N.E.2d 652, 658 (1981); City of Chicago v. American Nat'l
Bank, 86 Ill. App. 3d 960, 963, 408 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1980); Elizondo v. Perez, 42 Ill. App. 3d
313, 315, 356 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1976); Danis v. Bridge Enters., Inc., 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv.
Sh. 2311, 2313, 397 N.E.2d 326, 328; Cooley v. Bettigole, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 526 n.13, 301
N.E.2d 872, 879 n.13 (1973); Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104,
106 (1971); Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash. App. 383, 392-93, 563 P.2d 1275, 1281 (1977). But see
Four Seas Inv. Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants Ass'n, Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 535 (1978); Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468 (1973) (both
suggesting that small businesses or individual commercial tenants may be entitled to raise some
of the defenses that have been accorded to residential tenants).
276 E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8 (1949).
277
228 See text and notes at notes 120-75 supra.
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Wright found the phrase that would thereafter be repeatedly invoked to trigger
influential, though imperfect, analogies to a changing sales law. The subject
matter of the lease was no longer to be called "premises"; it was, rather, a
"well known package of goods and services."'" Implied in the transfer of this
package was not a "covenant," the conveyancing word used in  Delameter, but a
"warranty," a word evoking the UCC warranties of merchantability 28' and
fitness for a particular purpose. 282
As Levi noted, legal categories typically undergo change in the course of
being applied in the "moving classification system" of the law .283 This can be
illustrated by the transformation of the meaning of "warranty" in the residen-
tial lease context. It is clear even from Javins that the implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases has small resemblance to implied warranties in
the sale of goods. The implied warranty of habitability applies even to patent
defects obvious to the "buyer" at the time of the "sale," and it obliges the
"seller" to maintain the premises during the term of the lease. 284 Under the
UCC, the buyer has no warranty protection against defects which he ought to
have discovered by inspection,'" nor is there any continuing duty on the part
of the seller to keep goods in repair. Furthermore, the UCC expressly recog-
nized that sales can be made on an "as is" basis and that implied warranties
can be excluded or modified in other ways, 286 while the implied warranty of
habitability generally either cannot be contracted out at al1, 287 or can be af-
fected by contract only in strictly limited ways. 288 When the implied warranty
is materially breached, the tenant may be allowed to remain in possession and
yet be excused from all or part of his rental obligation.'" Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, however, a buyer of defective goods generally has to choose
between rejecting the goods, or keeping them and suing for damages. 290
288 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970) (footnote ommitted). The phrase was echoed in Green v. Superior Court, 10
Cal. 3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (1974); Steele v. Latimer, 214
Kan. 329, 334, 521 P.2d 304, 308 (1974); Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d
316, 324, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1292, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 314 (1979); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272,
282, 405 A.2d 897, 902 (1979); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973);
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 125 (W. Va. 1978).
281 U.C.C. 4 2-314 (1978).
282 Id. 5 2-315.
tea 	 supra note 276, at viii.
" 4 Cunningham, supra note 1, at 86-95.
283 	 5 2-316(3)(b) (1978).
286 Id, 55 2-314, 2-315, 2-316.
287 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.49 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); URLTA, supra note 3, 5 1.403 (a)(1). See also Foisy v. Wyman,
83 Wash. 2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
288 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 59.18.360 (Supp. 1981) now provides that a waiver is
permitted only if it does not appear on a standard form, there is no substantial bargaining ine-
quality between the parties, it has been approved by a public official or the tenant's lawyer, and it
does not violate the public policy promoting safe and sanitary housing.  Id. CAL. Civ. CODE
ANN. 5 1942.1 (West Supp. 1981) permits a waiver for separate consideration.
289 See text and note at notes 194-214 supra.
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In this last respect, the difference between the lease of real property and an
ordinary sale of goods appears crucial. A sale, even on credit, is meant even-
tually to sever the seller's connection with the goods and to make the buyer the
owner. A lease establishes an ongoing relationship between lessor and lessee,
which, whether characterized as a property or contractual relation, is meant to
be temporary, with all rights to be reunited in the lessor at some future time.
The landlord retains an interest in the leased real estate in a way that a seller of
tomatoes, sewing machines, or tools, does not. Indeed, it is unclear to what ex-
tent, if at all, the UCC warranty provisions are applicable to leases of personal
property. 291 This is why the Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet292 would not
hold that the state of Oregon had acted unconstitutionally in singling out the
landlord's possessory action for more expedited treatment than other civil ac-
tions.293 As Levi has noted, however, the misuse or misunderstanding of a con-
cept need not impede its progress in the law.'"
Thus Javins, not Delameter, marked the point in the case law where the im-
plied warranty idea was accepted, given definition, and connected to other
ideas. But characteristically,'" as reasoning by analogy proceeded, and cases
were classified as within or without its reach, the concept of implied warranty
itself changed. As a term implied in nearly every residential lease, regardless of
the will of the parties,'" it does not belong to the domain of contract but to that
of regulation. This was made especially clear in Foisy v. Wyman, 297 where the
tenant of a single-family house with an option to buy was permitted to assert
breach of implied warranty as a defense to an unlawful detainer action even
though the rent had been fixed at a low rate because of obvious defects on the
premises.298 The Washington Supreme Court swept aside the landlord's con-
tention that bargaining had in fact occurred, saying, "[w]e believe this type of
bargaining by the landlord with the tenant is contrary to public policy and the
purpose of the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability.' '29 9
The implied warranty was soon joined by a growing list of other lease
terms that are either required or forbidden, or strictly controlled, by court deci-
sion or statute. The landlord cannot be exculpated from liability for his own
negligence.309 The lease may not include a confession of judgment by the ten-
291 	 v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95 (1980) has held the provisions
of the U.C.C. are not applicable to leases of personal property. The court distinguished cases
holding otherwise on the grounds that they have typically involved leases with irrevocable options
to buy. Id.
292
	 U.S. 56 (1972).
293 Id. at 72-73.
294 "Erroneous ideas, of course, have played an enormous part in shaping the law."
LEVI, supra note 276, at 6.
295 Id. at 3-6, 9.
296 Most court decisions imposing an implied warranty have made it nonwaivable. See
Cunningham, supra note 1, at 95-97. Under the URLTA the landlord's duties may not be waived
except as specifically provided in $ 2.104(c) and (d). URLTA, supra note 3, 55 2.104(c)-(d).
2" 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
298 Id. at 28, 515 P.2d at 164.
299 Id.
3" E.g., McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 447-50, 486 P.2d
1093, 1096-97 (1971); URLTA, supra note 3, 5 1.403(a)(4).May 1982]
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ant, an agreement to pay attorney's fees, or a waiver of any of his rights and
remedies under the Act."' The taking and use of the tenant's security deposit
is carefully regulated."2 For public housing, the list is different, but even more
extensive."3
As the list of required and forbidden terms expands, it begins to resemble
a lease implied-in-law. At the same time, a great deal of judicial discretion in
dealing with landlord-tenant disputes is authorized by the doctrines of good
faith and unconscionability that emerged in contract law, were consolidated in
commercial law by the Uniform Commercial Code, and arc now included in
the URLTA.3°4 These innovations might at first appear to be a long-needed
response to the problem of the standardized lease."' Llewellyn long ago
recognized that traditional contract law was not suited to deal with standard-
ized form contracts and proposed that they should be handled within a private
law framework by enforcing only those terms "which a sane man might
reasonably expect to find" on the form. 306 As Dawson has shown, the West
German Bundesgerichtshof, using general clauses of the German Civil Code,
developed an effective way of dealing with this problem, adopting an approach
quite similar to that proposed by Llewellyn: it treated a person as having sub-
mitted only to those standardized terms with which he should " 'fairly and
justly reckon.' "3°'
Current American residential landlord-tenant law, however, has replaced
the standard form lease, not with terms based on the reasonable expectations of
the parties, or even of one of them, but with terms usually justified by reference
to the public interest."8 This need not exclude the idea of protecting expecta-
301 E.g., URLTA, supra note 3, 5 1.403(a)(1), (2), (3).
302 E.g., id. 5 2.101; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 186, 5 18 (West Supp. 1981).
303 24 C.F.R. 55 866.1-866.59 (1981); Fed. Reg. 33,402-408 (1975). See also Lefcoe,
HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, BO YALE L.J. 463 (1971).
904 E.g., URLTA, supra note 3, 5 1.302 (obligation of good faith); 5 1.303 (uncons-
cionability). See generally Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). See also Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of
Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619.
303 See generally Kirby, supra note 37.
906 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939).
907 Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1108
(1976).
sob 	 , URLTA, supra note 3, $5 1.102, 2.104 comments, referring to "vital interests
of the parties and the public" in comments to 5 1.102 and again in the comment to 5 2.104. See
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir.),  cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970). Judge Wright stated:
The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well
documented. Tenants have very link leverage to enforce demands for better
housing. Various impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such
as racial and class discrimination and standardized form leases, mean that land-
lords place tenants in a take it or leave it situation. The increasingly severe short-
age of adequate housing further increases the landlord's bargaining power and
escalates the need for maintaining and improving the existing stock. Finally, the
findings by various studies of the social impact of bad housing has led to the
realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely to the
unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in a slum.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961) ("The need550	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
tions. But as Charles Reich pointed out in a now famous article, " 'the public
interest' is all too often a reassuring platitude that covers up sharp clashes of
conflicting values, and hides fundamental choices."'" In fact, regulatory
landlord-tenant law seems to be less concerned with reliance and expectations
than are traditional contract law and commercial law. 31° It tends, rather, to
reflect ever-changing compromises among, and fluctuating perceptions of, the
interests involved, as well as diverse views about the relationship of law to
economic and social reality. It is therefore susceptible to more frequent, abrupt
and unpredictable changes than are the private law remnants of property and
contract. Thus, research in landlord-tenant law no longer involves study of the
gradual judicial elaboration and qualification of rules, standards, and prin-
ciples, so much as it does consultation of the annual legislative deposit in the
pocket parts of each state's statute books.
In this respect, the judge-made component of lease law has become similar
to its counterparts in the law governing employment contracts, franchise
agreements and other relational contracts that are considered to be of great
social importance.'" From this point of view, the forces that have been at work
in landlord-tenant law are merely elements of a more general transition in at-
titudes about the role of the judge in developing private law. At least since Car-
dozo, it has been accepted that judges have a creative law-making role in the
private law areas. 312 However, until the 1960's it was widely believed that such
judicial activity should proceed through a process of reasoned elaboration 313
and that it should rest on some rule, principle or standard."* Today, as the
and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is
too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor.").
Cf. U.C.C. $ 2-302, comment 1 (1978) [Unconscionable Contract or Clause] ("The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.") (citation omitted).
309 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964).
40 ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 721-22.
3" The story of how common law countries have massively abridged freedom of contract
over the past century is recounted in id. at 571-779.
On "relational" contracts, see generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 691 (1974); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Lau, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978).
312 The following passage has often been cited in implied warranty decisions: "A rule
which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making to
express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that
perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social conscience." B. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924). This statement, however, must be read in the context of
the fundamental problem to which Cardozo's lectures were addressed: "the need of a philosophy
that will mediate between the conflicting claims of stability and progress, and supply a principle
of growth." Id. at 1. Cardozo's conclusion does not especially favor the exercise of judicial discre-
tion in "the public interest": "I come back in the end to the text with which I started: 'Law must
be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.' .. I can only warn you that those who heed the one [of
the two precepts] without honoring the other, will be worshipping false gods and leading their
followers astray." Id. at 143.
313 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 161-71 (Tent. ed. 1958).
31 See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, an unpublished paper, excerpts fromMay 1982]
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former private law fields become more public and administrative, judges ex-
press these attitudes less frequently, and engage more openly in speech and ac-
tivities that would once have been considered legislative."'
Several of the most recent residential landlord-tenant cases clearly il-
lustrate the shift from a private-law to a regulatory mode. In Park West Manage-
ment Corp. v. Mitchell, 316 the implied warranty was held breached by service in-
terruptions and unsanitary conditions caused by a 17-day strike of the
landlord's maintenance employees and the refusal of public garbage collectors
to cross picket lines at the property in order to remove trash."' The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's award of a 10 percent abatement in
rent for the month when the strike occurred, and rejected the landlord's claim
that he should not be absolutely liable, saying: "[A]s the statute places an un-
qualified obligation on the landlord to keep the premises habitable, conditions
occasioned by ordinary deterioration, work stoppages by employees, acts of
third parties or natural disaster are within the scope of the warranty as
well. "315 The Court did not even discuss the facts, appearing in the decision
below, that the apartments were rent-controlled and that the leases had con-
tained force majeure clauses . 319
A 1979 Massachusetts case, also involving the question of strict liability
for breach of the implied warranty, sheds more light on the nature of the war-
ranty. In Berman & Sons, Inc. v. jefferson,"° the tenant withheld part of the rent
because she was without heat and hot water from time to time for a period of
about two months owing to breaks in underground pipes, which the landlord
had acted promptly to repair."' The questions before the court were whether
the landlord was entitled to a reasonable time to repair the defects before rent
abated and whether rent should abate at all in the absence of fault or bad faith
on the part of the landlord."' The court held that the rent abates as soon as the
landlord has notice of the conditions and that his lack of fault and his
reasonable efforts to repair do not prolong the duty to pay rent."' The landlord
had argued, along contractual and commercial law lines, that neither the ex-
pectations of the parties nor reasonable trade customs justified imposing strict
which appear in HART & SACKS, supra note 313, at 421-26. A later version was published in 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). For expressions of similar views in landlord-tenant cases, see Justice
Schaeffer's opinion in O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 440-41, 155
N.E.2d 545, 597 (1958), and Chief Justice Neely's opinion in Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114,
136 (W. Va. 1978) (Neely, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
3" See Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and
the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1980) (the reprinted text of Professor Atiyah's inaugural
lecture at Oxford University on February 17, 1978).
316 47 N.Y.2d 316, 327, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1979).
3" Id. at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
313 Id. at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (citation omitted).
3" See the opinion of the Appellate Division, 62 A.D.2d 291, 294, 296, 404 N.Y.S.2d
115, 117, 118 (1978).
320 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2459, 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979).
321 Id., 396 N.E.2d at 983,
322 Id. at 2460, 396 N.E.2d at 983.
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liability when a system broke down and the landlord acted promptly to repair
4. 324 But the court made it clear that it regarded such arguments as misplaced:
"These contentions have no place within the framework established in Hem-
ingway. Considerations of fault do not belong in an analysis of warranty. "325
Rejecting a proferred analogy from the UCC, the court explained that the im-
plied warranty was not a private law obligation:
Here the landlord appears to have proceeded in a responsible manner
consistent with landlords' trade usage. However, the State Sanitary Code,
not such usage, provides the proper yardstick for measuring the landlord's
conduct. The Hemingway court removed the landlord's duties under the Code from
the realm of private ordering. Those duties cannot be waived, bargained away,
or qualified by customary practice.326
It is now out in the open that legislation, and judicial activity in relation to it,
have shifted the residential landlord-tenant relationship from the domain of
private to that of public law. The Berman opinion also affords a glimpse of the
ideology underlying the current shift of residential landlord-tenant law from
contract and property law to judicial and legislative regulation: "[Wje note
that the landlord's liability without fault is merely an economic burden; the
tenant living in an uninhabitable building suffers a loss of shelter, a
necessity.''' 327
Courts in other jurisdictions also have imposed strict liability for breach of
the implied warranty328 and in landlord-tenant tort cases.329 But it would be a
mistake to interpret these recent case-law developments as themselves con-
stituting the dawn of the era of regulatory landlord-tenant law. They represent
only a judicial recognition of the largely accomplished fact of the transition of
residential lease law from the private law fields of property and contract to an
area in which public regulatory law predominates. The basic rules of residen-
tial landlord-tenant law are now, overwhelmingly, to be found in an extensive
network of statutes, codes and ordinances. And, although the phrase "implied
warranty of habitability" may evoke the names of certain landmark cases to
most lawyers, those cases, as we have seen, were themselves dependent on
legislation, either by elaborating policy contained in, or by deriving private
rights from, anterior housing codes or other safety laws. 33° Furthermore, (hese
324 Id. at 2464-65, 396 N.E.2d at 985.
325 Id. at 2462, 396 N.E.2d at 984.
326 Id. at 2465-66 n.11, 396 N.E.2d at 986 n.11. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
322 Id. at 2463, 396 N.E.2d at 984-85.	 "
328 The California Supreme Court held in Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46,
54-55, 623 P.2d 268, 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707, 712 (1981) that the implied warranty was breached
whether or not the landlord had had a reasonable time to repair.
329 In Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc.. 2d 745, 747-51, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636-38 (Civ.
Ct. 1976), the landlord was held strictly liable for a tenant's injuries by an analogy to products
liability cases as strained as Judge Wright's analogies to sales of goods. The Court recognized the
difficulties with its theory, but said, "[L]ike the typical consumer, the tenant relies upon the
landlord's skill, reputation and implied representation of safety." Id. at 751, 381 N.Y.S.2d at
638. Contra, Segal v. Justice Ct. Mut. Haus. Coop., Inc., 105 Misc. 2d 453, 454-59, 432
N.Y.S.2d 463, 465-67 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
"° See text and notes at notes 120-75 supra.May 19821
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cases were often followed by legislation codifying or qualifying their results."'
As we have seen, contrary to what many believe, ,the implied warranty in most
states was established by legislation, not judicial action. 332 At least nineteen
states have comprehensive, systematic landlord-tenant legislation, 333 while in
many other states, especially the most urbanized ones, the landlord-tenant
laws arc more varied and voluminous than the Uniform Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act."4 Indeed, the very mass, complexity and changeability of
landlord-tenant law in a state like Massachusetts, fbr example, constitute
obstacles to rational codification.
That the basis of the typical statutory rearrangement of landlords' and
tenants' rights and duties is not contractual is explicitly recognized in the
draftsmen's comments to the implied warranty section of the URLTA:
"Standards of habitability dealt with in this section are a matter of public
police power rather than the contract of the parties or special landlord-tenant
legislation. "333 In general, the URLTA is to be construed as legislation of
"carefully considered permanent regulative intention." 3" The reason given
for such regulation is that "[ v]ital interests of the parties and the public under
modern urban conditions require the proper maintenance and operation of
housing.'"" •
Besides URLTA and similar legislation establishing new relationships
between landlord and tenant, there are in various states and localities other
forms of regulation of leasing which are more far-t-eaching and more explicitly
directed to public goals: condominium-cooperative conversion control, rent
regulation, eviction control, and consumer protection laws applicable to
residential leasing by persons in the rental housing business. About half of the
states, and over half of the central cities in the thirty-seven largest metropolitan
areas in the United States, have adopted some form of regulation protecting
tenants in buildings about to undergo conversion into condominiums or
cooperatives. 3" It has been estimated that as many as one-eighth of all rental
units in the United States may be subject to some form of rent regulation. 339
331 E.g.; WIS. STAT. ANN.	 704.07 (West 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 5 235-b
(McKinney Supp. 1981).
332 Cunningham, supra note 1, at 6.
333 See note 134 supra.
"4 See, e.g., the New York and Massachusetts statutes cited in note 135 supra.
3 " URLTA, supra note 3, 5 2.104 comment.
336 Id. 5 1.104 comment.
"7 Id. 5 2.104 comment.
338 U. S . DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE CONVERSION OF  REN'r-
AL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES
AND IMPACTS X1-4-10, X11-1-20 (Wash. D.C. June 1980) [hereinafter cited as CONVERSION OF
RENTAL HOUSING]. For an excellent analysis and critique of the legislation, see BERGER, New
Residential, .supra note 7, at 731-42. See Note, The Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Con-
version, 78 MICH. L. REV. 124 (1979), for a discussion of the constitutionality of various types of
conversion regulations.
339 J. BRENNER & H. FRANKLIN, RENT CONTROL IN NORTH AMERICA AND FOUR
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 46 (1977). Rent regulation tends, however, to be concentrated in certain
geographical areas, notably in New York City, the District of Columbia, and in numerous New
Jersey cities. CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 338, at V-16 states that only 7 of the554	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
Like conversion control laws, rent regulation typically includes a complex
scheme of eviction controls. Two jurisdictions have general eviction controls. 34°
Finally, statewide consumer protection legislation forbidding unfair or decep-
tive trade practices has been made applicable to leases in a number of states. 34'
Most remarkable among these laws are the 1974 New Jersey statute, 342
already referred to in the eviction context,343 and two District of Columbia
statutes.344 The New Jersey law, statewide in application, simultaneously
regulates evictions and condominium-cooperative conversions, and initiates a
form of general rent regulation by providing that a tenant cannot be removed
after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase in rent, unless the proposed in-
crease in rent is "not unconscionable. "345 The District of Columbia Rent Con-
trol Lain,'" imposes eviction controls on all rental units within the District 3"
and establishes a system of rent control applicable to all multifamily rental
housing, with the exception of most newly constructed buildings.348 The
District of Columbia Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 19803"
regulates both the sale and conversion of all rental housing within the District.
In the case of sales, it requires the landlord to afford individual tenants or
tenants' organizations (depending on the type of property) an opportunity to
purchase the property before it can be sold. 35° It also provides that occupied
rental property may not be converted to condominiums or cooperatives unless
a majority of the tenants vote in favor of such a change."' Even when a
landlord receives authorization to convert, the Act provides that he may not
evict for this reason any tenants age sixty-two or over whose household incomes
are less than $30,000 a year .3" Since the statute expires by its own terms in
September, 1983,333 it is uncertain whether these extended interests of elderly
37 largest metropolitan areas have some form of rent control. Ia. See also Blumberg, Robbins &
Barr, The Emergence of Second Generation Rent Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240, 241 (1974).
Owners of H.U.D. subsidized projects and public housing authorities are, of course, subject to
extensive regulation of the rents they can charge. 24 C.F.R. 55 401.1-401.6, 55 861.401-861.404
(1981).
340 The District of Columbia and New Jersey, see text at notes 260-62 supra.
541 Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 514, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977); Com-
monwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467, 329 A. 2d 812, 820 (1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1975). See also Note, Consumer Protection Legislation and the Assertion
of Tenant Rights: The Massachusetts Paradigm, 59 B.U.L. REV. 483 (1979).
34' N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1981).
343 See text at notes 260-62 supra.
344 Rent Control Law, D.C. CODE 5 45-1501-45-1597 (1981); Rental Housing Con-
version and Sale Act of 1980, D.C. CODE S 45-1601-45-1657 (1981).
345 N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1981).
546 D.C. CODE 55 45-1501 — 45-1597 (1981).
342 Id. S 45-1561.
34° Id. 5 45-1516.
349 Id. 5 45-1601-45-1657.
"° Id. 5 45-1631-45-1641.
351 Id. S 45-1611-45-1618. Certain conversions to non-profit cooperatives for low and
moderate income housing may be exempted from this requirement.  Id. S 45-1611(b).
352 Id. 5 45-1616.
353 Id. S 45-1618.May 1982]
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tenants can endure- until they die, move away or give cause for eviction, or
whether they can exist no longer than the effective duration of the Act.
With rent and eviction control, regulation moves from the collateral to the
core terms of the lease or rental agreement. Typically the only provisions in
residential leases that are "bargained for" are the rent and the duration of the
lease.3S4 When these provisions are regulated by law, the role of the will of the
parties tends to be confined to the decision of whether to enter the relationship
or not. The landlord is treated as controlling a resource of such central impor-
tance in society that it must be regulated, and the courts start borrowing
analogies, not from sales law, but from public utility law. 3"
Landlords, now coming under similar kinds of regulation to those long
imposed on employers, have fewer options with respect to their increased costs
of doing business. In particular, the option of passing all or part of such costs
on to the consumer is more problematic since the consumer is the tenant. Fur-
thermore, a rent increase, like an eviction, may be treated as retaliatory, or
may be limited by rent control laws. To the extent that landlords have to ab-
sorb such increased costs, it has been feared that the effects on the supply of
low-income rental housing will be adverse, because some landlords will aban-
don their buildings and others will convert them to more profitable uses." 6
Predictably, landlords who have sought to change the form of their investment
have begun to encounter obstacles to the exercise of their right to alienate or
alter their interest, just as employers have in connection with moving or closing
down plants."'
354 Kirby, supra note 37, at 232.
355 E.g. , Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N. J. 604, 622, 350 A.2d 34, 43
(1975), where the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a rent control case, borrowed guidelines from
public utility rate setting cases. The approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court is severely
criticized from an economic point of view in Berger, New Residential, supra note 7, at 720-27.
3" See text and notes at notes 383-403 infra.
357 In 1965, for example, the Supreme Court held in Textile Workers Union of America
v. Darlington Mfg. Co, , 380 U.S. 263 (1965), that while an employer is free to close its  entire
business for any reason, an employer in control of several plants cannot shut down one of them if
its purpose is to "chill" unionism at the remaining operations and if the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that the closing would have such an effect. Id. at 274-75. In a 1972
landlord-tenant case, Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge
J. Skelly Wright analogized freely from Darlington to hold that a multiple-unit landlord cannot
withdraw rental property from the market, if the effect would be to "chill" the exercise by
tenants on his remaining properties of their rights with respect to the condition of the premises,
unless the landlord could produce some legitimate business reason therefor. Id. at 860-61.
Labor law has also encountered the difficulty that a plant relocation or partial closing
may not only produce a chilling effect on union activity, but may also contribute to unemploy-
ment in the vicinity. In response to this problem, the NLRB long required unionized employers
to bargain with the union before any sale or closing. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 509-23 (1976). This duty could not prevent the
employer from ultimately going out of business, but it did represent an effort to avert or at least
mitigate the consequences by forcing the parties to explore possible alternatives and to discuss the
modalities of the shut-down. In 1981, however, the Supreme Court overruled this long-standing
policy of the Board and held that an employer has no duty to bargain with the union concerning
the decision to close part of its operations, although it was obliged to bargain about the  effects of
such closing. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 2585 (1981).556	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
The ongoing transformation of the technical foundations of landlord-
tenant law is obviously related to well-known and advanced changes in certain
basic assumptions of classical property and contract law. The notions of
freedom of contract and private property that once dominated legal thought
have given way, as various forms of regulation have become relatively perma-
nent features of the legal landscape. There is more regulation of the landlord-
tenant relationship, however, than there is of other consumer-supplier relation-
ships. Although much of the statewide landlord-tenant legislation and the
evolving landlord-tenant case law is recognizable as an aspect of the develop-
ment of "consumer law," rent control and condominium-cooperative conver-
sion controls tend to be established by local ordinances and have no analogues
in the law governing the purchase or lease of other goods and services. Pro-
fessor Berger has usefully pointed out, in the case of rent control, that since
markets for housing are local, consumers have more opportunity to secure
legislative attention for rising rents than they do in the case of, say, rising food
prices which are, for the most part, determined by conditions on a national
market.
...[W]here the market is local—in the sense that the thing to be sold can-
not be moved in response to higher prices elsewhere—local price regulation
is feasible. It is the feasibility of local rent control that explains its rapid
growth. Consumers, frustrated by their inability to keep up with the rising
cost of living, naturally turn to local government to solve those problems it
is capable of solving. Wherever tenants form a large percentage of the local
population, local office-holders are subject to pressure for rent contro1. 358
Professor Berger's reasoning also seems to provide a convincing explanation
for the proliferation of condominium-cooperative conversion controls. Rental
housing is one of the few areas within which local government can respond to
consumers' concerns.
With increased regulation, the landlord-tenant relationship takes on some
characteristics of a status, with its terms and conditions fixed by law. 359 The
movement in residential landlord-tenant law turns out not to have been a
movement from one field of private law to another, but a movement from
private law to public law. One should neither exaggerate or underestimate the
distance that current landlord-tenant law has travelled from classical law. As
Sir Frederick Pollock wrote towards the end of the nineteenth century:
The truth is ... that the law of landlord and tenant has never, at least
under any usual conditions, been a law of free contract. It is a law of con-
"B Berger, New Residential, supra note 7, at 730.
3S9 Of course the bureaucratic statuses of today are different from the traditional statuses
that Sir Henry Maine referred to when he spoke of a movement from status to contract. H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 141 (1959) (Orig. Publ. 1861). These modern statuses do involve
diminished freedom and mobility, but, depending as they do on law and the vagaries of public
policy, they do not offer a corresponding increase in support and security characteristic of tradi-
tional societies where the family, not the individual, was the basic unit. See generally GLENDON,
supra note 17, at 205-45.May 1982]
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tract partly express, partly supplied by judicial interpretation, and partly
controlled by legislation and sometimes by local custom. So far as the terms
and conditions arc express, they are in the vast majority of cases framed by
landlords or their advisors. The tendency of judicial interpretation has also
been, until lately, to incline the scale of presumption in favor of the
landlord on doubtful points; and the same may be said of the ruling tenden-
cy of legislation down to the middle of the present century.36°
Pollock's observation on the practice of his time is but a specific instance of the
now widely recognized fact that "freedom of contract" often enabled the
economically powerful "to legislate by contract in a substantially authoritarian
manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms." 36' A major
change since Pollock's time is that today, in the vast majority of residential
leases, important terms and conditions are framed by courts and legislatures
rather than by "landlords or their advisors," and that appellate courts have
tended to incline toward the residential tenant, rather than the landlord on
doubtful points. Power has shifted mainly, however, not to the tenant, but to
the state.
V. COMMERCIAL LAW FOR COMMERCIAL LEASES
The rise of regulatory landlord-tenant law in the residential area has ac-
centuated the increasing separation between commercial and residential lease
law. In the first place, the bulk of commercial lease litigation today concerns
the interpretation, construction and application of language in the parties'
rental agreement, while most residential lease litigation consists of summary
process cases at the trial level and statutory questions, broadly speaking, at the
appellate level. Up to a point, both areas have tracked the modernization of
contract law generally and both have become subject to increasing regulation.
No area of commercial law in modern nations is entirely unmixed with ad-
ministrative law, with its requirements for licenses, permits and so on, but the
degree and kind of regulation in the "consumer law" branches increasingly
sets them apart.
Most of the statutes increasing tenants' rights and landlords' obligations
have been made expressly applicable to leases of dwellings only, while, in the
case law, precedents from one area are used with declining frequency in the
other. As we have seen, courts dealing with residential lease cases will not
automatically accept commercial law analogies  , 362 and courts in commercial
lease cases have frequently signalled that recent developments in residential
landlord-tenant law will not be automatically transposed to the commercial
context. 363 In New Jersey, where the regulatory trends described in this article
perhaps have reached their fullest development, a trial judge recently explained
3" F. POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 150 (3d ed. 1896).
3" KESSLER & SHARP, supra note 43, at 6. See generally M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 100, 125-40 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
362 	 text and notes at notes 284-93 supra.
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his refusal to apply commercial lease precedents on liquidated damages to a
residential tenancy by saying: "Residential tenancies are governed by a
specific body of statutory law and by a body of case law founded on totally dif-
ferent principles than cases involving commercial tenancies. '364
This divergence trend does not mean, however, that the commercial or in-
dustrial landlord-tenant relationship is still ruled by classical principles in the
absence of controlling lease provisions. To the contrary, all indications are that
commercial landlord-tenant law is evolving new principles by analogy to
modern contract and commercial law, with suitable adjustments for the various
types of commercial leases, many of which still resemble a sale of real property
more than they do a chattel lease or a sale of a "package of goods and
services. "365 On the basis of the few cases available, one can hazard the guess
that in commercial contexts the doctrine of independence of covenants, which
now comes into play only exceptionally when the parties have failed to make
their principal obligations mutually dependent in the lease, will increasingly
give way to the usual contract rules on the dependence of covenants and on the
courses of action open to one party when the other substantially defaults on a
material obligation. The rejection of the implied warranty of habitability in
commercial leases need not, as some courts have thought,366 entail the reten-
tion of the doctrine of independent covenants. The better view seems to be
that, while a commercial tenant may not defend a rent or ejectment action by
alleging a breach of an implied covenant of habitability, such a tenant should
have the benefit of the contract doctrine of mutuality of covenants, at least
where the landlord's promise in issue was "a significant inducement to the
making of the lease by the tenant. '"67
In like manner, the absence of implied warranties of habitability should
not impede the courts in commercial cases from resorting, where appropriate,
to commercial standards of good faith and unconscionability. 368 Nor should it
prevent the implication, by analogy to Uniform Commercial Code provisions,
of warranties of merchantability or fitness for the purposes of the lease . 369 As
under the U.C.C., such implied warranties need not prevent merchants from
agreeing to rentals "as is" or from excluding or modifying the warranty in
other ways.37° Nor should they protect the tenant who knew, or should have
365 Spialter v. Testa, 162 N.J. Super. 421, 427, 392 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1978), aff'd per
curiam, 171 N.J. Super. 181, 408 A.2d 444 (App. Div. 1979) (footnote omitted).
365 See Greenfield & Margolies, An Implied Warranty of Fitness in Nonresidential Leases, 45
ALB. L. REV. 855 (1981).
366 E.g., Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108, 110 (D.C. 1973).
367 Teodori v. Werner, 490 Pa. 58, 65, 415 A.2d 31, 34 (1980). See also Pawco, Inc. v.
Berman Knitting Mills, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 443, 446-52, 424 A.2d 891, 893-97 (1980).
366 Cf. U.C.C. 1-203 (1978) (good faith obligation in performance or enforcement of
duties or contracts); 2-103(1)(b) (1978) "good faith in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"; 5 2-302
(1978) (Contracts or clauses unconscionable at time of making).
369 See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Earl Millikin
Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis.2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963). See U.C.C. 55 2-314, 2-315 (1978).
J7° Coulston v. Teliscope Productions Ltd., 85 Misc. 2d 339, 340, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553,
554 (App. Div. 1975). See U.C.C. 55 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 (1978).May 1982)
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known, that the premises were unsuitable."' In working out the  remedies for
breach of such warranties, however, neither the residential lease nor the com-
mercial sales analogies are fully transposable to commercial lease situations. In
a business context, where shelter from the elements is not at stake, the policies
underlying summary process statutes—protecting landlords against the
simultaneous loss of rent and detention of their income-producing asset—are
apt to be given more weight."
It is probable, too, that the legal treatment of long-term leases of land or
entire buildings will diverge somewhat from that of most leases of space in
multi-unit buildings or shopping centers, where the commercial tenant, much
like the residential tenant, typically depends on the landlord for continuing
maintenance and services."3 Long-term leases under which the tenant ac-
quires control of an entire building, or where buildings are not involved, are
more analogous to sales of real property, while short-term commercial leases of
small shops or offices are in certain ways similar to residential leases. This fact
has begun to be recognized in a few cases suggesting that the latter category of
commercial leases may require special treatment." 4 On the whole, it seems
likely that modernization of commercial lease law will continue primarily
through the application and tailoring of modern contract and commercial law
to landlord-tenant problems rather than through direct regulation of the rela-
tionship in the public interest."75
VI. TOWARDS A RIGHT TO HOUSING?
A. Law and Reality
The revolutionized residential landlord-tenant law of the states now
stands in approximately the same relation to housing reality as does federal law
relating to public housing. It represents a formal legal commitment to an ideal
of decent housing, which cannot be met without corresponding financial com-
mitment. The difference is that Congress, when it established national housing
goals, was aware of the extent to which they were merely goals."6 But state
courts and legislatures seem not yet to have generally recognized that the
"t Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 455, 251 A.2d 268, 274 (1969); Service
Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 95-97, 542 P.2d 652, 660-61 (1975). See U.C.C.   § 2-316(3)(b)
(1978).
3" See Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 560-61, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624-25
(1980). See U.C.C. SS 2-601, 2-714, 2-715 (1978). See also text after note 290 supra.
373 See distinctions suggested by Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 365, at 869-88.
"4 Demirci v. Burns, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (1973); Four Seas
Investment Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 608, 613, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 535 (1978).
373 One cannot discount the possibility of an eventual increase in such regulation,
however, since federal wage and price controls, if they should reappear, would probably be ap-
plicable to commercial leases, as they were briefly in 1970-71. Lev, Economic Control Regulations: A
Descriptive Commentary, 13 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 1277, 1294-95 (1972).
376 The "declaration of national housing policy" in the preamble of the Housing Act of
1949, 42 U.S.C. S 1441 (1976), states:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and560	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
private sector warranty of habitability is as programmatic as is the national
commitment to the goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family.' '377 An exception is Chief Justice Richard Neely of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals who dissented in part from that
court's decision adopting a non-waivable implied warranty of habitability,
pointing out:
Experience in the last thirty years . . . adequately demonstrates that the
creation of new law does not usually create new wealth .
The inability to redistribute wealth which does not exist which inex-
perienced administrators in former colonies found to their disappointment
to be an unrepealable law of nature in the 1960s will daunt the majority's
efforts to create first class housing in West Virginia. 378
One reason state courts and legislatures have been slower to recognize
housing reality in the private sector than their federal counterparts have in the
public sector is that that reality has been obscured by widely held misconcep-
tions about the suppliers and consumers of rental housing. Recent changes in
the rental housing market challenge the premises upon which much landlord-
tenant law reform of the past twenty years has been based. To see why this is
so, one must look back to the nineteenth century when multiple-unit rental
housing in the United States began to appear, mainly as tenement housing for
the poor. Today, after nearly a hundred years which saw the rise, and then the
exodus, of the urban middle class, this form of housing is increasingly occupied
once again by persons whose incomes are too low to permit them to pursue suc-
cessfully the American dream of home ownership.'" Affordability has become
the most pressing problem in rental housing, not only, as widely believed,
because the cost of housing is increasing, but because  the class of renters is
becoming poorer, owing to the withdrawal of the more affluent households,
especially husband-wife households, from the rental market into ownership
status.38° This shift in the profile of consumers of rental housing, with lower-
income households increasingly predominating, portends, according to
Sternlieb and Hughes, "an ominous lag in rent paying capacity in the
future. "381 That fewer than two-fifths of all renters in 1970 paid more than a
the health and living standards of its people require housing production and
related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,
the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the
clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the
goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American fami-
ly, thus contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and
to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.
Id. (emphasis added).
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
'" Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 132 (W. Va. 1978) (emphasis in original).
319 G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUSING 1-3 (1981).
3e° Id. at 5.
38 ' Id. at 3.May 1982]
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quarter of their incomes for rent, in contrast to nearly a half of all renters in
1977,592 must be understood not only as reflecting the rising cost of housing,
but also the changing composition of the rental population.
It is unclear whether the partisans in the residential landlord-tenant law
revolution believed that change in the law would improve the quality without
affecting the supply of rented housing."' Among the spectators, however,
there were many who feared that the imposition of new duties, and therefore
costs, on landlords would adversely affect both the quality and the supply of
such housing.'" There was much theoretical discussion and speculation about
the probable effects on the rental housing market of housing code enforcement
and the new rights and remedies of residential tenants."' Thus far, however,
empirical studies have been able to find little discernible impact of the changed
law, for better or worse, on the cost, quality and supply of rental housing, or
even upon proceedings in the courts of first instance where most landlord-
tenant litigation takes place. 386 In fact, no one really knows what effects the law
might eventually have on these matters, for housing codes in general have not
been strictly enforced,387 nor have tenants' new rights and remedies been
vigorously or widely asserted.'"
The most recent of the empirical studies of the effects of changed landlord-
tenant iaw surveyed the operation of the URLTA in Cleveland, Ohio, and
Portland, Oregon.'" The authors' overall conclusion was that the Act "has
been only marginally effective, benefiting primarily middle-income tenants in
382 Herbers, Rapid Rise Reported in Nation's Housing, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1981, at 1,
col. 6, and at B14, rol. 1.
383 See Judge Wright's opinion in Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853,
856-71 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor:
Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and Income Redistribution Policy,  80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095-96
(1971).
384 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 356-59 (2d ed. 1977); Abbott, supra note
I, at 67-86, 108-11; Meyers, supra note 7, at 889-93.
385 See the authorities cited in notes 383 and 384 supra; Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis,
Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the
Ackerman- Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1098, I 1 39-40 (1975); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A
Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor,  82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1186-92
(1973).
386 Krumholz, Rent Withholding as an Aid to Housing Code Enforcement, 25 J. HOUSING 242
(1969); Abbott, supra note 1, at 62-64, 139-46; Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan
Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 8, 60-70
(1973); Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study,  66 CAL. L. REV. 37,
54-68 (1978); Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice,  28 STAN.
L. REV. 729, 774-76 (1976); Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, supra note 385, at 1098, 1116-36. See also
the summary of several empirical studies in Cunningham,  supra note 1, at 144-53.
3" Abbott, supra note 1, at 49-66, surveys and adds to the literature.
388 Abbott, supra note 1, at 63-64; Gerwin, supra note 129, at 666; Hirsch, Hirsch &
Margolis, supra note 385, at 1130-31; Moiser & Soble, supra note 386, at 61; Note, The Great Green
Hope, supra note 386, at 776-77.
see 	 & McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) in Opera-
tion: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 555.562	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
the suburbs or in the cities' better neighborhoods, while largely failing in the
aim of helping the inner-city poor and upgrading the quality of slum
housing. "390 One factOr inhibiting the effectiveness of the Act seemed to be the
informed initiative it required on the part of tenants. 3" But the authors of the
study also sensed that the limits of law itself were involved: "Certainly most
landlord-tenant problems in urban centers involve social policy considerations
beyond the reach of private civil suits."'"
Although changes in landlord-tenant law cannot be directly implicated,
and may not even be especially important among the variety of factors that
bear on housing availability, it is true that the supply of rental housing,
especially low-cost, low-quality, housing, in the United States has been
diminishing in recent years. In 1979, it was estimated that annual losses of
rental units were running at about two percent, due to a falling rate of produc-
tion of rental units, combined with loss of existing units through abandonment
or demolition of older buildings. 393 Conversion of desirable buildings into con-
dominiums and cooperatives, although a significant and controversial
phenomenon in several metropolitan areas, has actually accounted so far for
only a small proportion of the annual losses nationwide.'" According to
Sternlieb and Hughes, the primary significance for rental housing of the con-
dominium-cooperative conversion movement is that it furthers a "cream-
skimming process" of withdrawal of middle class and affluent tenants from the
rental housing market, which in turn augurs ill for the rent-paying capacity of
the remaining tenant population as a whole.395 The condominium-cooperative
conversion issue, which is generally viewed as involving a conflict between the
property rights of landlords and tenants, also represents a conflict between low-
income renters seeking affordable rental units and aspiring homeowners who
are increasingly being priced out of the market for traditional detached single-
family homes. Consequently, the state and local condominium conversion con-
trol movement is to some extent in tension with long-standing federal legisla-
tion and programs encouraging home ownership.
The shrinking rent-paying capacity of tenants is an important element
among the factors that have reduced the investment appeal of rental housing to
39° Id. at 559 (italics omitted).
'' Id. at 586, 600-01.
3" Id. at 606.
393 Oser, Major Drop in Rental Units Cited, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1979, at D1, col. 6. But
see Lowry, Rental Housing in the 1970s: Searching for the Crises, in RENTAL HOUSING; IS THERE A
CRISIS? 23 (Weicher, Villani & Roistacher eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as RENTAL HOUSING]
who states that "It is more accurate to say that in many places renters are unable to find dwell-
ings of the size and quality they have come to prefer at rents they are accustomed to paying." Id.
at 35.
394 According to CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 338, at ii, 1.3 percent
of the nation's rental housing had been converted to condominiums by the end of 1979. The con-
version trend has been gathering momentum since 1977, but its impact is mainly felt in the
largest metropolitan areas. Id. at 1V-9-10.
'" STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 379, at 3, 95.May 1982]
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sizeable investors.399 Operating costs rose sharply in the 1970's, but market
forces, and in some places, rent control, have limited the extent to which rents
could rise.'" Despite the inconclusiveness of empirical studies on the point,
housing economists Sternlieb and Hughes speculate that habitability re-
quirements, together with other changes in landlord-tenant law, may also
discourage institutional investors to some degree. 398 The desire to own rental
housing as a hedge against inflation may be offset for many investors by the
fact that the recent residential landlord-tenant reforms involve them in a
continuing relationship rather than an arm's length transaction. The need for
frequent interaction with tenants and the fear of being seen in an unpopular
light, may be contributing to the increasing avoidance of the field of rental
housing by investment capita1. 399 Unlike employers, who have long accom-
modated themselves to the constraints of a legally imposed "relationship" with
their employees, landlords cannot simply pass their increased costs on to their
consumers, since the tenant is the consumer and the tenant population is
becoming poorer.
One effect of the increasing disinclination of large investors, for whatever
reasons, to be residential landlords, is that much more rental housing is being
purveyed by small operators than is generally supposed.409 In fact, as of 1978,
the majority of rental housing units in the United States were in two- to four-
unit buildings or in single-family homes, while fewer than 10 percent were
located in buildings containing fifty units or more."' Most of the buildings
with fewer than five units are owned and operated by small-scale investors."'
The growing importance of the small operator in the rental housing market
raises troubling questions about residential landlord-tenant law, both of the
conventional and regulatory sort. To the extent that small operations are ex-
empted from the application of such laws (as they often are, especially under
rent control schemes), a substantial proportion of tenants are left without the
protections that the landlord-tenant revolution appeared to confer. Yet if small
operators are not exempted, one slightly more affluent sector of the population
is being burdened with the essentially public responsibility of furnishing a
housing subsidy of sorts to the poor without discussion or, probably, even con-
sciousness on the part of the lawmakers that this is what is occurring."'
396 RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 393, at 23, 28, 29.
397 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 379, at 12. See also RENTAL HOUSING, supra note
393, at 23, 24, 28-30. Lowry points out that between 1970 and 1980, rents not only rose less than
operating costs but less than the consumer price index. Id. at 28.
398 STERNLIEB & HUGHES, supra note 379, at 12.
399 Id.
4" Id. at 94.
401 Id. at 9.
+02 RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 393, at 23, 31.
403 One day in any metropolitan housing court suffices to revise the stereotype of the
slumlord. In Boston, for example, the landlord is apt to be a policeman, taxi-driver or school
teacher who has mortgaged himself to the hilt to buy a two- or three-decker building in which he
and his family occupy one floor. The tenant is apt to be elderly or a single-mother, one of the 25564	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
Recall, however, that the main focus of the landlord-tenant litigation and
legislation of the 1960's and 1970's was the quality of rental housing. On this
point, studies now beginning to appear indicate that the habitability issue,
which was at the very core of the landlord-tenant revolution, is decreasingly
central to the reality of housing deprivation, especially in urban areas of the
United States. Even at the lowest income levels, the primary housing problem
in the United States today is not substandard conditions, but inadequate in-
come. 404
Despite the fact that a uniform definition of habitability has eluded policy-
makers and researchers, 405 there seems to be general agreement that the quali-
ty of American housing has steadily improved since the Depression years of the
1930's when President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of a third of the population
as being ill-housed. 408 Traditionally, a dwelling was considered inadequate if it
was in need of major repairs or if it lacked complete plumbing."' Under these
standards of physical condition and sanitation, nearly a quarter of all occupied
units in 1960 were still substandard, with the highest incidence of problems oc-
curring in rural areas.408 By 1970, however, only 11 percent of households,
most of them in rural areas, still lived in physically inadequate housing even
though the concept of housing adequacy had become steadily more demand-
ing. 409
After 1970, the federal government ceased trying to measure housing
quality through information on physical conditions and plumbing facilities
gathered in the Census. Instead, beginning in 1973, the Annual Housing
Survey has collected data on some thirty different kinds of housing
deficiencies." The information yielded by the Annual Housing Survey has
been used by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office
of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office to develop
new more sophisticated definitions to replace the traditional measures of inade-
quate housing.4" In 1980, a study by the United States Department of Hous-
percent of the city's population who are dependent on welfare. Sternlieb & Hughes, The Changing
Demography of the Central City, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, August 1980, p.48, 53.
404 J. WEIGHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 13, 15 (1980); Frieden
& Solomon, The Nation's Housing: 1975 to 1985, 87 (MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban
Studies, 1977); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, INTERIM REPORT 6 (October 30,
1981).
4°' REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY 67-68 (1968); Frieden & Solomon, supra note 404, at 80-98; WEIGHER, supra
note 404, at 15.
406 Frieden & Solomon, supra note 404, at 87; WELCHER, supra note 404, at 13-15; PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404, at 11; Frieden, Housing, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
WORK, 639, 643 (17th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Frieden,  Housing].
497 Keith, An Assessment of National Housing Needs, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 210
(1967).
vui Id.
409 Frieden, Housing, supra note 406, at 643-44.
419 WEICHER, supra note 404, at 18.
411 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404, at 15.May 1982]	 LANDLORD-TENANT LAW	 565
ing and Urban Development found that only .5.3 million households (4.4 per-
cent) were then living in physically inadequate conditions as judged by current
standards.412 According to every available measure of quality, the housing
stock steadily improved from 1970 to 1977. 4' 3 Nevertheless, certain
geographical areas have not followed the national trend. According to the 1981
Interim Report of the President's Commission on Housing:
They [inadequate units] are found disproportionately in rural areas in the
South and in older larger cities. New York City and the nearby New Jersey
cities of Newark, Paterson, and Jersey City showed a particularly high  con-
centration (almost 19 percent), double the average of other large cities.
New York City alone accounted for more than 29 percent of all deficient
housing in large cities identified in the 1977 Annual Housing Survey and
for 9 percent of all deficient housing in the country. Miami and
Washington, D.C. both had more than a 16 percent incidence of inade-
quate units.4'4
Although substandard housing has been reduced nationwide, it clearly remains
a severe hardship for many persons.
The President's Commission on Housing attributes this residual inade-
quacy in housing quality to inadequate incomes, a finding which may presage
a shift in federal housing policy from production strategies to the direct provi-
sion of financial assistance through vouchers. 4" Critics of the Reagan ad-
ministration's emerging housing policy point out, however, that the voucher
system presupposes that recipients of vouchers will be able to find housing on
the private market, a questionable assumption in the nation's large cities where
low-cost housing is scarce. 416 It is hard to find fault with the voucher system as
such, since it directly attacks the problem of affordability of rental housing. In
the current housing market, however, it can hardly be an adequate solution in
itself to the housing problems of the poor.
At the same time that the physical condition of the housing stock was im-
proving, however, new problems were coming to light that have caused many
experts to accept broader concepts of what constitutes housing deprivation.
The concept of inadequate neighborhood environment was introduced. 4"
Then, it was observed that as the supply of low-cost, low-quality housing
diminished, many people who lived in adequate housing were spending a third
412 Herbers, Rapid Rise Reported in Nation's Housing, N , Y. Times, March 23, 1981, at 1,
col. 6, and at B14, col. 1.
4" Ozanne, Double Vision in the Rental Housing Market and a Prescription for Correcting It, in
RENTAL HOUSING: IS THERE A CRISIS? 39, 43 (Weicher, Villani & Roistacher eds.  1981).
414 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404, at 18.
4" Id. at 4. The Commission has recommended a system of "consumer-oriented hous-
ing assistance grants" as the primary federal program for responding to the shelter needs of the
poor. Id. at 5.
416 Daniels, U.S. Housing Vouchers for City Opposed, N .Y . Times, February 5, 1982, at B1,
col. 3, and at B8, col. 3.
"7 "Neighborhood inadequacy" was deemed to be a form of housing deprivation when
public services or street conditions are so unsatisfactory that the affected resident expresses the
desire to move to get away from them. Frieden & Solomon, supra note 404, at 84-85, 91-92.566	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
or more of their incomes for rent. According to a major study published in
1977:
Housing deprivation is changing from a problem of physically inadequate
shelter to a problem of excessive cost. The number of households living in
physically inadequate units has declined sharply since 1960. However, the
number of those paying an unreasonably high percentage of their incomes
for rent has increased rapidly. 4'a
Using a concept of "excessive cost" as a form of housing deprivation, MIT
reseachers estimated in 1973 that of the then total of 69.3 million households in
the United States, there were 6.3 million households living in physically inade-
quate units, and an additional six million who were living in adequate units but
carrying an excessively high rent burden. 419 Bernard Frieden predicted in 1977
that in the foreseeable future, "In all likelihood, the housing problems of the
poor will increasingly take the form of excessive cost burdens rather than
shelter inadequacy. "4" This seems already to have been the case in 1977. Ac-
cording to information from the 1977 Annual Housing Survey, of the 10.5
million households with the lowest income levels in the United States, two
million lived in housing deemed inadequate by present standards.42' But
almost two-thirds of these 10.5 million poor households paid  over 30 percent,
and a quarter paid more than half, of their incomes for rent. 422
The prevalence of this form of housing deprivation among low-income
tenants sheds light on the following conclusion of Brakel's study of the URLTA
in operation in Oregon:
[W]hatever the changes in the law—the most common landlord-tenant
dispute before the courts is an unchanging one, precipitated by the tenant's
inability, or carelessness relative to his obligation, to pay rent. In these
cases the tenant's delinquency has little to do with his or her subjective
assessment of the condition of the premises (whatever the objective judg-
ment may be), with any breach of plausible expectations that the tenant has
of the landlord (whatever the latter's formal, legal obligations may be), or
with any other unrequited rights or remedies that could realistically be
viewed to be a part of the relationship between landlords and tenants in
marginal neighborhoods. The conclusion that follows from this recognition
is that the URLTA is fundamentally irrelevant to the typical landlord-
tenant case, rent delinquency, and that the courts are right —despite much
clamoring by reformists about judicial ignorance and insensitivity—in
treating the act as largely irrelevant. The act's relevance may be primarily
to the atypical case, and—to turn the idea around once more—the unremit-
"8 Id. at 87. A household was considered to have an excessive rent burden if (1) it con-
sisted of two or more people with a head under age 65 and its rent amounted to more than 25% of
its annual income, or (2) it consisted of a single person or two or more people with a head over 65
and its rent amounted to more than 35% of its annual income. Id. at 83-84.
4" Id. at 85. Another form of housing deprivation, overcrowding in physically adequate
units, was found to be a relatively minor and declining problem affecting only half a million
households in 1973, Id. at 95.
42° Frieden, Housing, supra note 406, at 644.
42 ' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404, at 21-22.
422 Id.May 1982]
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ting application of the act to typical disputes (i.e. , FED cases) may be ine-
quitable and unresponsive to the realities of the individual landlord-tenant
relationship as well as to the relationship in the aggregate—to the social and
economic forces that affect ownership, tenancy and transfer, and the quali-
ty of housing. 423
These observations of the ABA researchers are consistent with the data that in-
dicate that "[gar more Americans, even among the poor, live in decent hous-
ing but pay a disproportionate share of their income in order to do so, than live
in housing that is seriously inadequate. "424
The role of law and governmental programs of various sorts in the im-
provement of housing quality that has taken place since World War II is,
however, problematic. It is likely that such improvement is more strongly cor-
related with rises, until very recently, in real incomes and a decline in the price
of housing relative to other goods, than with the long-standing federal housing
programs, not to mention the relatively recent changes in state landlord-tenant
jaw .425 If so, a worsening economic situation would most probably be accom-
panied in time by a decline in housing quality, both with respect to the physical
condition of the premises and the accompanying services. In such a case the ef-
ficacy and durability of the new landlord-tenant laws would be severely tested.
B. A Revolution in Ideas
It begins to appear that the primary significance of the landlord-tenant
revolution so far has been ideological. This effect, however, is no small matter.
Ideas have consequences, and one consequence of the transformation of
landlord-tenant law may well be the introduction of implicit rights to decent
housing and, to a degree, continuity of tenure in American residential leasing
law.
It is fairly clear that there is presently no constitutional right to housing,
decent or otherwise.'" Any rights in this area are ordinary legal rights
recognized by legislatures or courts. The Supreme Court in recent years has
433 Brakel, supra note 3, at 582.
424 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404, at 11. See also notes 418-22 supra. One
would expect, however, that in cities where poor housing is concentrated, the picture would be
somewhat different from that presented by Brake] & McIntyre's study of URLTA's operation in
Ohio and Oregon.
423 WEICHER, supra note 404, at 27. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 404,
at 24, 27.
426 Mention should be made here, however, of recent New York litigation which
resulted in a trial court's order to the State of New York to provide bed and board for at least 750
homeless derelicts in New York City. The decision in Callahan v. Carey, reported in New York
Law Journal, December 11, 1979, p.1., was based in part on the New York Constitution, which,
unlike the U.S. Constitution, provides for certain "social" rights: The aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, 5 1. New York's highest court held in 1977 that this provision not only
proclaimed a public goal, but imposed an affirmative duty upon the state to aid the needy.
Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452-53, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731-32 (1977).568	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
been reluctant to "constitutionalize" rights which require appropriations to
make them fully effective, 427 although for a while in the late 1960's it seemed
that things might be otherwise. At that time, a line of Supreme Court decisions
emerged in which it appeared that the "importance" of an asserted interest
would determine the extent of protection the Court would accord it. 428 These
cases were susceptible to the interpretation given them by Professor
Michelman that there might be constitutionally protected fundamental rights
to food, shelter, education, wages, or more generally, to "minimum
welfare. "429 But several decisions of the 1970's were difficult to square with this
theory, among them, Lindsey v. Normet. 4"
The plaintiff-tenants in Lindsey had claimed that the State of Oregon's
summary process law was unconstitutional because, among other reasons, it.
allowed the landlord to evict them from the leased premises for non-payment of
rent without permitting the tenants to try to show that their failure to pay the
rent was justified or excused by the landlord's failure to keep the premises in a
fit, safe and habitable condition. The State's refusal to permit this defense was
claimed to amount to a denial of due process of law to the tenants. Also, the
statutory establishment of a special speedy eviction procedure different in a
number of ways from the usual civil suit was claimed to deny them the equal
protection of the laws. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the
tenants' claim that the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain
peaceful possession of one's home" ought to be recognized as interests so fun-
damental that they cannot be interfered with unless the State demonstrates
some overriding interest."' The Court said:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary hous-
ing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
'" See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) ("Bill of
Rights" in the U.S. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 creates
no substantive rights in favor of mentally retarded persons). But see Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 50 U.S.L.W. 2539, 2540 (3d Cir. 1982) (mentally retarded persons have
right to noninstitutional treatment under state statutes even though federal statutes confer no
such right).
428 E.g. , Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits
without opportunity for prior hearing denied due process; " . . welfare provides the means to
obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care.") (footnote omitted); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (garnishment of wages without prior hearing
was denial of due process and "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the
wall.") (footnote omitted); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (durational residen-
cy requirement for AFDC benefits violated right of interstate movement; impaired "the ability of
the families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.").
424 Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969). See also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional
Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Michelman,
The Adueni of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV, 207, 209 (1970).
4" 405 U.S. 56, 72-74 (1972). See also San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 29-44 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 89-90 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1970).
431 405 U.S. at 73.May 1982]
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and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitu-
tional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any
recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his
landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of rent or other-
wise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-
tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial functions. Nor should we
forget that the Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of
private property or the income therefrom. 432
Several important legal ideas about housing are contained in this concise
paragraph. The Court here, as well as elsewhere in its opinion, 433 clearly in-
dicates that it considers the leased premises to be the landlord's "property."
This over-simplified characterization of the relationship then triggers in the
landlord's favor the express language of the Constitution protecting private
property. Of more import to the present argument, however, is the suggestion
that it is for the legislature, not the court, to decide which interests are to be
protected. Thus, it begins to seem that Goldberg v. Kelly434 may not be the pro-
genitor of a constitutional right to minimum decent subsistence, but merely an
assurance that due process will protect statutory welfare rights from being
taken away without proper notice and hearing. Since the "legislature" that
defines the private sector landlord-tenant relation will be a local legislature,
there can be many different, and constitutional, versions of this relationship.
The view which had seemed to explain the earlier procedural due process cases
appears only in justice Douglas' dissent: "[W]here the right is so fundamental
as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be
more embracing. "4"
The message of the majority opinion in Lindsey, as well as that of several
other decisions of the 1970's, is that the "rights" which will be protected
against loss without proper hearing are limited to those rights created or
recognized by legislation.436 In 1979, and despite the line then being taken by
the Supreme Court, Michelman developed further his idea that people might
have constitutional rights to such elements of welfare as housing, food, health
services and education."' He justified the use of the term "rights" because in-
dividual interests in such matters could be seen to "regularly and detectibly
432 Id. at 74.
433 "The tenant is, by definition, in possession of the property of the landlord . .	 " Id.
at 72. It is elementary property learning that a lease transfers the ownership of the present in-
terest to the tenant. E.g., Nyer v. Munoz-Mendoza, 1982 Mass. Adv. Sh. 184, 187, 430 N.E.2d
1214, 1216-17 (1982) (landlord does not have "property rights" in door of leased premises).
434 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients entitled, as a matter of due process, to a hear-
ing before their benefits are terminated).
433 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 89 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
436 See Meachum v. Fano, 429 U.S. 215, 226-29, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-50 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-79
(1972).
4" Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659,
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[exert] a practically significant influence on judicial decisions" and he defend-
ed calling them "constitutional" because the alleged welfare rights could be
seen to make a difference in whether a statute or an act under statutory
authority was held valid.438
Michelman also developed a theory of the proper relation between the
court and legislature with respect to these rights. He avoided the impractical
claim that courts on their own could or should somehow cause welfare pro-
grams to be established. He suggested, rather, that the courts should and
already do treat legislation in the welfare area as meant to satisfy rights.439 He
argued, drawing on the work of John Hart Ely,44° that such rights have a basis
in the written Constitution: the Constitution speaks through its organic struc-
ture and the relationships of its parts as well as through particular provisions.
Thus, there can be values and purposes which are not expressed but which
underlie and pervade the entire constitutional scheme. The Supreme Court, in
fact, on a number of occasions, has accorded constitutional status to rights that
are not enumerated in the Constitution, for example, rights to marry, to pro-
create, to travel, and to educate one's children as one chooses, and it has spun
out various and often surprising implications of a "right to privacy." Since no
one would dispute that the Constitution is pervasively concerned with political
participation through representation, Ely has claimed that "representation
reinforcement" is a fundamental and constitutionally grounded value that
justifies constitutional review of procedures and outcomes of procedures to
determine whether they unduly restrict or deny persons the opportunity to par-
ticipate in political processes."' Michelman expands on this notion to argue
that since food and shelter are "universal, rock-bottom prerequisites of effec-
tive participation in democratic representation," rights to these and other
minimum elements of welfare ought to be protected under Ely's theory of
representation reinforcement. 442
Michelman's analyses of the cases are illuminating. If one looks at the
facts and outcomes of each case to try to determine what was really moving the
Court, and if one discounts the Court's proferred rationale to some extent, it
does seem, especially in the earlier cases, that the Court has attached great
significance to the "importance" of the interests involved. 443 Thus, welfare
and wages were accorded protection, but college tuition allowances were
not.444 Related-household requirements were upheld in the area of zoning, but
43B Id. at 660.
439 Id. at 663.
440 See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility,  53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978);
Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term—Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 5 (1978); Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV.
451 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review]. See also J, ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
**I Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra  note 440, at 456.
442 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 437, at 677.
443 Id. at 680. See also cases cited in note 428 supra.
444 Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (due process requires thatMay 1982]
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struck down in the food stamp program. 445 Tribe has agreed with Michelman,
saying that in the procedural due process cases the "tension among rhetoric,
reasoning and results . . . may well reflect an unarticulated perception that
there exist constitutional norms establishing minimal entitlements to certain
services. . . . "446 Yet a similar type of analysis of Supreme Court decisions,
carried out by Van Alstyne in a 1980 article, indicated that the Court is being
moved increasingly by concern for property interests of the traditional type."'
Van Alstyne found that the type of property acquired by work, thrift, skill and
exchange is being accorded a higher level of due process protection by the
Court than property which is dispensed by or acquired with the aid of the
State."' He claimed that what distinguishes a large group of cases of the
decade of the 1970's from the doctrinal development of related decisions in the
preceding decade is the Court's revived emphasis on property rights, 449 which
is in turn related to a renewed faith in the marketplace, 4" with a corresponding
tempering of "the social impulse to regulate and redistribute." 4" As Van
Alstyne sees it, 1972, the year of Lindsey o. Normet, marked a turning point:
Prior to 1972, the extent to which grievous personal loss was buffered by
procedural due process depended most of all on the supposed importance of
the threatened loss. Since 1972, however, even "grievous loss" is not sub-
ject to any due process requirements of one who cannot locate some vested
private property in the thing thus threatened.'"
Thus, Michelman in 1979 and Van Alstyne in 1980 examined many of the
same and related decisions, but picked out two quite different patterns: the
former, a development in which a group of important "welfare rights" ap-
peared to exert a "regular and detectable" influence on decisions; the latter, a
trend toward a revival of solicitude for old-style entrepreneurial property
rights. This does not mean that one is right and the other is wrong. Even when
welfare recipients be afforded opportunity for hearing before benefits are terminated) and
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (Wisconsin wage garnishment pro-
cedure, without notice and opportunity for prior hearing, violates principles of due process)  with
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (higher
education cannot be equated with elements of basic subsistence so as to invoke compelling state
interest test for validity of state university residence classifications).
4" Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (local zoning or-
dinance restricting land use to dwellings occupied by not more than two unrelated individuals
does not involve deprivation of any fundamental right) with United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536 (1973) (exclusion of individuals in unrelated households from federal
food stamp program constitutes unjustifiable discrimination).
446 Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1079 (1977).
447 Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties:
The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 66, 70, 82 (1980).
448 Id. at 80-81.
449 Id. at 70.
"1) Id. at 77.
4" Id. at 72.
452 Id. at 81. See also Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).572	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
they are examining the same cases, they may be like two observers of a drawing
by M. C. Escher in which it is impossible to distinguish the figure from the
ground.
Another observer with a colder eye, however, disputes that there is a pat-
tern at all. To Bork, the ambiguity in the cases is "less suggestive of an emerg-
ing constitutional right to basic needs than it is of a politically divided Court
that has wandered so far from constitutional moorings that some of its
members are engaging in free votes.  " 453 Repeated dicta by the Court itself also
weigh against Michelman's and Tribe's attempts to show that the Court is im-
plicitly recognizing constitutional rights without saying so. Even before Lindsey
v. Normet, the Court had indicated in Dandridge v. Williams454 that satisfaction of
basic needs was not going to be treated as a constitutionally protected
interest.455 Although acknowledging that welfare involves "the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings,  " 456 the Court characterized it
not as a right, but as a matter of "wise economic or social policy. " 457 In 1973,
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 458 the Court said of educa-
tion, "the importance of a service . . . does not determine whether it must be
regarded as [constitutionally] fundamental. " 459 Again, in 1976, in Lavine v.
Milne, 460 the Court said, "[w]elfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and
neither the State nor Federal government is under any sort of constitutional
obligation to guarantee minimum levels of support. "461 Michelman has argued
that these apparently contrary statements in the cases can be distinguished or
reconciled with his welfare rights thesis. 462 For the most part, however, they
have been interpreted to mean that there are no constitutional welfare rights. 463
One may entertain the possibility that "welfare rights" are latent con-
stitutional values. This approach would be consistent with Tribe's presentation
and analysis of the development of American constitutional law as a process of
continuing shift in emphasis and rearrangement among several basic models of
constitutional values. 464 Any given value may be now in the foreground, then
almost out of sight, now on the rise, then waning, or entering into different
balances with other values.
If "welfare rights" do exist and remain latent, however, even such earnest
advocates as Michelman and Tribe do not contend that the courts can directly
4" Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
695, 698.
134 397 U.S. 471 (1969).
436 	 at 483-87.
456 Id. at 485.
457 Id. at 486 (footnote omitted). .
4" 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
459 Id. at 30.
460 424 U.S. 577 (1976).
46' Id. at 584 n.9.
462 Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 437, at 688-93.
465 Levin, Education as Constitutional Entitlement: A Proposed Judicial Standard for Determining
How Much is Enough, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 703, 703.
464 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1978).May 1982]
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fulfill the government's alleged constitutional obligation to meet the most basic
needs of citizens. 465 Nor do they suggest that the courts could order the
legislature to make housing appropriations. In Michelman's view, "welfare
rights" mean that the Court should treat welfare legislation as though it were
intended to satisfy constitutional rights.466 Tribe amplifies this notion by
observing that, after the initial welfare decisions are made by state and federal
legislatures, the role of the courts will usually be confined to enforcing pro-
cedural protections against deprivations of benefits and policing the determina-
tion of what constitutes eligibility and need."'
American thinking about these matters could perhaps benefit from the
distinction made in Italian constitutional law between provisions which are
directly enforceable and those which are "programmatic.  "466 Many of the
Italian Constitution's social goals, the right to employment, for example, im-
pose a duty on the legislature to work toward their realization, but create no
directly enforceable rights in individuals. 469 They are, in one sense, just "plat-
form plank[s] elevated to constitutional status.  "470 But it is not to be dis-
counted that, representing a national commitment, they may also give a cer-
tain direction and impetus to public policy. 47'
However inconclusive the discussion of constitutional welfare rights may
be on the point at issue among constitutional law theorists, it does provide
useful perspectives on the housing rights that seem to be implicit in the recent
development of residential landlord-tenant law. In the first place, it points up
the difficulty of separating housing rights from the general problem of rights to
a minimum decent subsistence. The need for awareness of this difficulty is fur-
ther established by recent research indicating that the problem of cost is cur-
rently the major form of housing deprivation among the poor,472 and by the
preliminary results of the national housing allowance experiments which sug-
gest that poor people prefer direct financial assistance to reduce their rent
burden over improved housing as such. 473
46' Id. at 920-21. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 437, at 684-85.
466 Id. at 684-85.
467 TRIBE, supra note 464, at 920 (footnote omitted).
468 M. CAppELLE1TI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 58
(1967).
469 Id.
470 Id.
4" Id. at 58-59.
472 See text and notes at 417-25 supra.
473 The H.U.D. experimental housing allowance program ("one of the biggest social
experiments ever undertaken"), which began in 1973 and ended in 1979-80, was designed to test
in 12 cities the idea that the best way to help poorly housed families was to give them money. B.
FRIEDEN & A. WALTER, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE HOUSING ALLOWANCE
EXPERIMENT? 50 (M.I.T.-HARV. JT. CENTER FOR URB. STUD., Working Paper No. 62 (1980).
Frieden and Walter's 1980 analysis of the preliminary results of the program, indicates that most
participating families chose not to spend much of the allowance on improved housing, but used it
rather to substitute for money of their own that they formerly had spent on rent. The fact that
most poor families in the experiment were reluctant to pay higher rents or to move in order to im-574	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
Whether thought of as involving housing or welfare in general, constitu-
tional rights or rights of some lesser status, the fulfillment of the national goal
of "a decent home" for all depends, at least in the case of the poorest
Americans, ultimately on public funding which can only be provided by
legislative action. Here, stagflation and scarcity, combined with racial
discrimination, pose formidable obstacles. Thus, in the end, the precise
nature, or even the existence, of a right to housing will be less important than
finding the political will to reach out to the needy. Some of the most difficult
problems will come from the fact that many persons consider human welfare
goals impossible to reach without a kind of economic activity that can be car-
ried on only at high human and environmental cost, now and in the future.
The social concerns of the 1960's that spurred the transformation of many
areas of the law, including landlord-tenant relations, are yielding ground to
policies favoring the military and "reindustrialization" to compete in world
markets, to the point where the historic national priority accorded to housing is
in question.
Poverty is increasing474 and most of the poor in the United States are
mothers and children, or elderly persons, with minority groups dispropor-
tionately represented. 475 In view of these statistics, the issue of housing for the
poor and politically less powerful will be one of many that involve the question
of what kind of society we are and what kind of society we want to become. In
this connection, one of the conclusions of Eugene Meehan's sad chronicle of
the failure of public housing in the United States deserves quoting at length:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the chief obstacle to a successful
public housing program was normative, a matter of values and priorities. it
is not a question of judging the extent to which the intent of the program
designers was good or evil or the degree to which the tenants were virtuous
and deserving. What needs restatement and underscoring is the very an-
cient precept that laws or policies must be supported by the customs,
beliefs, and values embedded in the social fabric.... [L]aws unsupported
by norms will fail. Regardless of technology, good will, rhetorical skill, or
depth of conviction, policies that lack support in the fundamental priority
structure of the society cannot succeed, particularly if they involve signifi-
cant costs. Efforts to circumvent the need for basic agreement on norms
make for tokenism and sham, for resistance and disobedience and,
prove their housing conditions brought to light an apparent conflict between the priorities of the
clients of the system and the administrators of housing programs: "The poor do not give housing
quality the high priority that program administrators do. . . Their main problem, as they see
it, is cost, not quality." Id. at 50. The housing allowance experiment appears to confirm the
results of a H.U.D. survey in three cities in the early 1970's in which 84% of households with in-
comes below $5000 rated their dwellings as satisfactory or better. Id.
4" Pear, Census Shows Increase in Need for Welfare Aid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1981, at B12,
col. 1.
475 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 127, Money, Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in
the U.S. 3 (1980) (Advance Data from March 1981 Current Pop. Survey) (U.S. G. P.O.,
Washington, D.C.).May 1982]
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ultimately, for violent resistance. When the social institutions responsible
for making policy must create programs out of an interplay of conflicting
and competing interests, the results will necessarily reflect the inadequacies
and inconsistencies that characterize society as a whole. Such factors limit
the life expectancy and potential for accomplishment of any policy pro-
posal. It is both futile and irresponsible to ask a public agency, whether a
school, a police force, or a local housing authority, to solve a problem that
society at large has not yet resolved in its fundamental norms. 476
The real problem, according to Meehan, is "society's inability or unwill-
ingness to come to grips with the problem of dealing with the poor and
powerless. "477
The residential landlord-tenant law reforms were, to a great extent, an at-
tempt to alleviate the kinds of housing problems that have been especially
burdensome for the poor. In one sense, these reforms, many of them long over-
due, represent progress over the classical law. At the same time, however, by
promoting the illusion that the problem of housing the poor can be resolved
within the private rental sector, 4" they are further evidence of our collective in-
ability to "come to grips" with an aspect of the problem of poverty.
CONCLUSION
Landlord-tenant law has always been a hybrid area in which many
strains, property and contract in particular, have mingled and vied for domi-
nance. What has here been called classical lease law was gradually transformed
by the same processes that have modernized private law generally. The revolu-
tion in residential landlord-tenant law, however, went beyond the mere accept-
ance of modern principles of private law. Over the past two decades, residen-
tial lease law has to a great extent escaped from the realm of private ordering,
in which the stronger party typically has the advantage, and has become sub-
ject to regulation "in the public interest." Commercial lease law, while
conforming generally to the modernization of commercial law, remains, to a
much greater degree, within the domain of private law and private ordering.
While it seems unlikely that the "publicization" of residential landlord-tenant
law will culminate in the foreseeable future in a constitutional right to housing,
the national housing legislation does represent a long-standing commitment to
the goal of a "decent home" for all citizens. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this goal will survive unimpaired under current political and economic
circumstances. Meanwhile, the revolution in landlord-tenant law has margin-
ally improved the legal position of energetic, informed and well-represented
478 E. MEEHAN, THE QUALITY OF FEDERAL POLICYMAKING: PROGRAMMED FAILURE
IN PUBLIC HOUSING 198-99 (1979).
477 Id. at 199.
478 West European countries, by contrast, intervene massively in housing markets. The
rental housing market in Western Europe, unlike in the United States, is dominated by the
public or quasi-public sector. J. BRENNER & H. FRANKLIN, RENT CONTROL IN NORTH
AMERICA AND FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES xi (1977).576	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:503
tenants; has brought yet another private law area under judicial and legislative
regulation; and has introduced ideas of security of tenure and social rights
whose transforming power is yet to be tested.